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SEESAC  South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the 
Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
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Introduction
A Diplomat’s Guide to the UN Small Arms Process is designed to assist and inform 
policy-makers who are new to the issue of small arms on the international 
agenda. While it is not meant to serve as a policy tool or as an exhaustive   
revie  w of the small arms process, this concise manual includes:
  definitions and terminology;
  summaries of key issues, instruments, and measures; and 
  an overview of the roles of various institutions.
The Guide will be regularly updated to reflect progress and changes in this 
area. Readers are invited to submit their comments and suggestions for the 
Guide to the Small Arms Survey at: sas@smallarmssurvey.org.
For more information on each of the issues highlighted, please visit the Small 
Arms Survey website at www.smallarmssurvey.org.PART 1
Definitions and Terminology A
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Box 1  
UN Panel definitions
Small arms: revolvers and 
self-loading pistols, rifles 
and carbines, assault 
rifles,1 sub-machine guns, 
and light machine guns.
Light weapons: heavy 
machine guns, hand-held 
under-barrel and mounted 
grenade launchers, 
portable anti-tank and anti-
aircraft guns, recoilless 
rifles, portable launchers of 
anti-tank missile and 
rocket systems and 
anti-aircraft missile 
systems, and mortars of 
less than 100 mm calibre.
Source: UNGA (1997a, para. 26)
Small arms, light weapons, and firearms
What are small arms and light weapons?
There is no universally accepted definition of a ‘small arm’ or of a ‘light weapon’. 
The Small Arms Survey uses the term ‘small arms and light weapons’ to cover 
both military-style small arms and light weapons as well as commercial firearms 
(handguns and long guns). The term ‘small arms’ is often used to refer to both 
types of weapons, including in this Guide. 
One of the most widely accepted definitions comes from the 1997 report of 
the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. In general 
terms, ‘small arms’ are designed for personal use and may be carried by one 
person; ‘light weapons’ are used by several persons or a crew and may be trans-
ported by two or more people, a pack animal, or a light vehicle (UNGA, 1997a, 
paras. 25, 27(a); see Box 1).
The International Tracing Instrument (see Part 2.3) provides the following 
definition of small arms and light weapons: 
any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or 
launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile 
by the action of an explosive, excluding antique small arms and light weapons or 
their replicas (UNGA, 2005b, para. 4; see Box 7). 
It then goes on to note that, broadly speaking, 
small arms are ‘weapons designed for individual 
use’ and light weapons are ‘weapons designed for 
use by two or three persons serving as a crew, al-
thoug  h some may be carried and used by a single 
person’ (UNGA, 2005b, para. 4). It subsequently re-
peats the list of examples provided in the 1997 UN 
Panel report.
1  As noted in the Small Arms Survey 2007: ‘There is no clear 
distinction between rifles and assault rifles. All assault rifles 
have the capacity of fully automatic fire, but so do some rifles. 
In general, assault rifles tend to be shorter, lighter, and fire   
smalle  r ammunition, and are therefore more portable’ 
(Gimelli Sulashvili, 2007, p. 33, n. 1).15
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A legally binding definition of ‘firearm’ is contained in the Firearms Protocol (see 
Part 2.1), which provides:
‘Firearm’ shall mean any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to 
expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action 
of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas. Antique firearms 
and their replicas shall be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case, 
however,  shall  antique  firearms  include  firearms  manufactured  after  1899 
(UNGA, 2001c, art. 3(a)). 
What is the difference between a small arm and a firearm?
The  terms  ‘small  arm’  and  ‘firearm’  are  often  used  interchangeably.  Gener-
ally speaking, the term ‘firearm’ is used in domestic settings and national laws 
governin    g the manufacture and transfer of such weapons, as well as civilian acces    s 
to them; the term ‘small arm’ is more commonly used to refer to the weapon an 
individual may use and carry in a military context. In this Guide, the terms ‘small 
arm’ and ‘firearm’ are used interchangeably unless the context indica  tes otherwise.
While the definition of ‘firearm’ adopted by the Firearms Protocol covers all 
‘small arms’, its coverage of ‘light weapons’ is limited in two ways. First, the 
weapon  must  have  a  barrel  since  the  definition  covers  ‘portable  barrelled 
weapons’ (emphasis added). This excludes light weapons that employ a tube or 
rail as opposed to a barrel, such as man-portable air defence systems (MAN-
PADS). Second, the weapon must ‘expel’ the projectile—in contrast to the defin-
ition of ‘small arms and light weapons’ in the International Tracing Instrument, 
which covers any weapon that ‘expels or launches’ the projectile (emphasis   
adde  d). This excludes those light weapons that use self-propelled projectiles, 
such as rockets or missiles. In these cases, the weapon does not ‘expel’ (drive 
out) the projectile as required by the definition. In essence, only light weapons 
that use cartridge-based ammunition qualify as ‘firearms’ under the Firearms 
Protocol definition (McDonald, 2005, p. 124).
What is the difference between ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ arms?
Military small arms and light weapons are used by armed forces, including 
intern  al security forces, in self-protection or self-defence, in close or short-range A
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Ejector rod
combat, in direct or indirect fire, and against tanks or aircraft at relatively short 
distances. Military small arms such as automatic rifles and carbines, sub-machin    e 
guns, and combat shotguns are designed to military specifications. Military light 
weapons include grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and heavy machine guns. 
Civilian possession of these types of weapon is generally prohibited, depending 
on the jurisdiction.
Domestic legislation stipulates which arms are permitted for civilian posses-
sion and the conditions under which the weapons may be used in individual 
states. Civilian small arms (often referred to in domestic law as ‘firearms’) fall 
under specific legal definitions of each jurisdiction and may be used for a range of 
legi  ti  mate purposes, such as hunting, sports and target shooting, personal protec-
tion, collection, pest control, and occupational uses such as personal security or 
veterinary work. Each state applies its own legal definition of small arms.
Main elements of selected small arms 
Figures 1–5 identify the main elements of handguns (revolvers and pistols) and 
long guns (pump-action shotguns, bolt-action rifles, and assault rifles). 
Figure 1 Parts of a handgun: revolver17
Figure 2 Parts of a handgun: semi-automatic pistol (Sig Sauer)
Figure 4 Parts of a long gun: bolt-action rifle (Mauser)
Figure 3 Parts of a long gun: pump-action shotgun
Note: These diagrams are indicative in nature only. For example, many semi-automatic pistols are 
striker-fired, rather than hammer-fired.
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Figure 5 Parts of a long gun: assault rifle (AK-47) 
Selected light weapons
Heavy machine guns are capable of firing calibres ranging from 12.7 mm up to 
but not including 20 mm, the size of the smallest cannon munitions. They are 
man-portable but are typically mounted on vehicles or ground mounts as   
anti-personnel and anti-aircraft weapons. They are effective against personnel, 
light armoured vehicles, low- and slow-flying aircraft, and small boats (Berman 
and Leff, 2008, p. 21; see Figure 6).
Figure 6 Heavy machine gun: Browning M2
Man-portable air defence systems, or MANPADS, are short-range surface-
to-air missile systems intended for attacking and defending against low-flying 
aircraft. Some are crew-served (sometimes known as CREWPADS), but most are 
easily handled by a single individual and are shoulder-launched (Berman and 
Leff, 2008, p. 16; see Figure 7).19
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Figure 7 MANPADS: SA-7
Anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs) are small missile-launching systems. 
They differ from unguided rocket launchers, such as the RPG-7, in that their 
missiles are steered, or ‘guided’, to a target after launch (that is, during flight). 
ATGWs are traditionally designed to disable armoured vehicles, but over the 
last decade producers have been developing variants intended for use against 
other targets, such as hardened bunkers and buildings (Berman and Leff, 2012, 
p. 1; see Figure 8).
Figure 8 Anti-tank guided weapon: SpikeA
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Mortars  are  generally  smooth-bored,  indirect-fire  support  weapons  that   
enabl  e users to engage targets outside their line of sight, such as behind hills, 
while minimizing their exposure to direct enemy fire. The Small Arms Survey 
recognizes three types of mortars in the light weapons category: ‘light’ (up to 
and including 60 mm), ‘medium’ (61 mm to 82 mm), and ‘heavy’ (83 mm to 120 
mm). With traditional ammunition, mortars can engage targets at distances   
rangin  g from less than 100 m from the firer’s position to more than 7 km away 
(Berman and Leff, 2008, p. 26; see Figure 9).
Figure 9 Light mortar: 60 mm
Life cycle of a firearm: selected intervention points
Figure 10 provides a general overview of the life cycle of a firearm from the point 
of manufacture through to deactivation or destruction. The diagram highlights a 21
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ors who hold and use small arms.
At the international level, states have committed themselves to regulating 
and controlling various stages in the life cycle of small arms through the adop-
tion of measures relating to their manufacture, transfer, storage, use, and dis-
posal (see Parts 2–4). Figure 10 indicates at which stages relevant international 
commitments exist (see the red boxes). The diagram points to commitments re-
garding the marking, record-keeping, and tracing of small arms and identifies 
the relevant provisions of international instruments. 
Firearms can enter or be diverted into the illicit market at multiple points in 
the life cycle. See the purple shaded area of Figure 10 for examples of points at 
which firearms enter the illicit market.
Ammunition
According to a 1999 report of the Group of Experts on the problem of ammuni-
tion and explosives, in the context of small arms:
Ammunition refers to the complete round/cartridge or its components, including 
bullets or projectiles, cartridge cases, primers/caps and propellants that are used 
in any small arm or light weapon (UNGA, 1999b, para. 14; see Box 2).2
2  The Firearms Protocol provides an adapted version of this definition: ‘“Ammunition” shall mean 
the complete round or its components, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder, 
bullets or projectiles, that are used in a firearm, provided that those components are themselves 
subject to authorization in the respective State Party’ (UNGA, 2001c, art. 3(c)).
What is calibre? 
Ammunition is defined in terms of calibre. The calibre measures the diameter of 
the gun’s bore and is expressed in hundredths or thousandths of an inch (for 
instance, .22 or .357) or in millimetres (for example, 9 mm). Thus, the metric 
equivalent of a ‘.38’ cartridge is a ‘9 mm’ projectile. Cartridges with the same 
calibre can differ according to the length of the case (such as 7.62 x 39 mm, 
7.62 x 51 mm, or 7.62 x 63 mm). One explanation for the large number of 
cartridge types currently in existence is that many countries used to set their 
own standards for their military weapons, such as the 7.5 mm French and .303 
British round (Pézard, 2005, p. 11). Most weapons of .50 (12.7 mm) or greater 
calibre are designed explicitly for military use, with some exceptions, such as 
.50-calibre pistols and rifles (Pézard and Anders, 2006, p. 23). A
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Figure 10 Life cycle of a firearm: selected intervention points
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ITI (para. 8(a))
FP (art. 8(1)(b));  
ITI (para. 8(a))
FP (art. 
9(c))
FP (art. 8(1)(c));
ITI (para. 8(c))
ITI (para. 9)
ITI (para. 9)
ITI (s. V); FP (art. 12(4))
PoA (II.9);  
FP (art. 7(b)); 
ITI (para. 12(b));  
ATT (art. 12(2))
PoA (II.9);  
ITI (para. 12(b));
ATT (art. 12(n))
FP (art. 
9(c))
PoA (II.9);  
ITI (para. 12(b))
PoA (II.9); FP (art. 7(b));
ITI (para. 12(b));  
ATT (art.12(1))
PoA (II.9); FP (art. 7(a));  
ITI (para. 12(a))
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ITI (para. 8(d))23
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Box 2 Components of a small-calibre cartridge
A cartridge is a complete round of ammunition, consisting of a projectile (bullet) and cartridge case 
(see Figure 11). The cartridge case contains the propellant and the primer (including the primer 
cap). Headstamps are applied to the base of most small-calibre cartridge cases; their text or 
symbols may identify the manufacturer, calibre, date, or a combination of any of these.
Figure 11 Components of a small-calibre cartridge 
Source: Bevan (2008, p. 3)
Bullet
Cartridge mouth
Cartridge case
Circular groove
(extractor)
Primer annulus
Primer cap
Primer
Powder
Headstamp
Cartridge base
Overall length
of round
Ammunition is a consumable, rather than a durable, good. While small 
arms and light weapons may remain in circulation for decades, ammunition has a 
relatively short shelf life and users require stockpiles to be replenished frequently.
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International small arms control efforts have focused on parallel major issues, 
including the negative effects of arms proliferation and misuse, and transna-
tional organized crime as major threats to stability and security. These efforts 
have generated several instruments and processes that have mutually influ-
enced each other: 
  Central among these is the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and 
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its   
Aspect  s—known as the Programme of Action or PoA—adopted by UN 
member states in 2001. 
  Four years later, UN member states adopted a spin-off of the PoA, the Inter-
national Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and 
Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons—known as the Inter-
national Tracing Instrument, or ITI.
  Another important instrument is the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufac-
turing  of  and  Trafficking  in  Firearms,  Their  Parts  and  Components  and   
Ammunitio  n—known as the Firearms Protocol. Adopted by UN member 
states in 2001, the Firearms Protocol formed part of a separate process focus-
ing on transnational law enforcement challenges. 
  The final component in the suite of principal global instruments governing 
small arms control is the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), adopted by UN member 
states in April 2013.
The PoA and ITI emerged and were negotiated in the context of arms control, an 
issue that falls within the mandate of the First Committee of the General Assem-
bly, which deals with disarmament and international security. The processes asso-
ciated with the PoA and ITI—meetings of states and the collection of reports—is 
overseen  by  the  UN  Office  for  Disarmament  Affairs  (UNODA).  The  chief  of 
UNOD  A’s Conventional Arms Branch served as the secretary-general of the con-
ference to negotiate the ATT, which also emerged through the First Committee. 
The Firearms Protocol, on the other hand, is one of three protocols to the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and forms part of 
a separate process focusing on transnational law enforcement challenges. Its 
elaboration took place in the context of efforts to address transnational organized 
crime under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the 
United Nations and its Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice; 27
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the process associated with its implementation is overseen by the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 
This part of the handbook provides an overview of these and other instru-
ments that establish the framework for small arms control at the international 
level. It includes a summary of the history, purpose, themes, and main commit-
ments of each instrument as well as a brief commentary on their relationships to 
each other. The instruments are discussed in chronological order.
2.1 The Firearms Protocol
Background
UN member states adopted the UN Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime in November 2000.3 UNTOC was supplemented by three protocols that 
address trafficking in persons, the smuggling of migrants, and the illicit manufac-
ture of and trafficking in firearms. The third of these—the UN Protocol against the 
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Compo  nent  s 
and Ammunition, known as the Firearms Protocol—was adopted on 31 May 2001 
by General Assembly Resolution 55/255 and entered into force on 3 July 2005 
(UNGA, 2001c). For states that have ratified or otherwise formally expressed their 
consent to be bound by it, the Firearms Protocol is legally binding.
History
In the mid-1990s, the international community was simultaneously deliberating 
on the establishment of an international instrument on transnational organized 
crime and considering the issues of illicit firearms trafficking and the impact of 
firearms on crime. The 1995 report of the Ninth UN Congress on the Prevention 
of  Crime  and  the  Treatment  of  Offenders  (‘the  Ninth  Congress’),  for  one,   
included a resolution calling upon states to promote adequate regulation of   
3  UNTOC was adopted by General Assembly Resolution 55/25 in November 2000 (UNGA, 2000a); 
it entered into force on 29 September 2003.A
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firearms (to protect public health and safety and diminish violent crime) and to 
take effective action against illicit trafficking in firearms; it also charged UN   
bodie  s  and  agencies  with  taking  up  the  issue  of  firearms  regulation  more   
seriousl  y (UNGA, 1995c, res. 9, paras. 7, 8, 11).
Furthermore, in 1995, ECOSOC asked the Secretary-General to initiate a 
study on firearms regulation to inform the consideration of measures to regulate 
firearms in order to prevent transnational illicit trafficking and suppress the use 
of firearms in criminal activities (ECOSOC, 1995, s. IV(A), paras. 7–8). The find-
ings of the study were published in March 1997 (ECOSOC, 1997).
The decision to develop an international instrument on firearms within the 
context of a convention on transnational organized crime arose out of these ini-
tiatives. In its Resolution 1998/18, ECOSOC recommended that states elaborate 
an international instrument to combat the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking 
in firearms and decided that the dedicated Ad Hoc Committee considering the 
development of a convention on transnational organized crime should hold dis-
cussions on such an instrument (ECOSOC, 1998, paras. 4, 7).
Accordingly, negotiations on the Firearms Protocol began in Vienna in   
January 1999 at the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee, with Canada submit-
ting a draft protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in fire-
arms, ammunition, and other related materials as one of three protocols attached 
to the draft convention under consideration (UNGA, 1998c).
Basis for the negotiations
The Firearms Protocol was agreed just a few years after the Organization of 
American States had adopted the world’s first regional instrument to combat the 
illicit trafficking in firearms and other commodities: the Inter-American Conven-
tion against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammuni-
tion, Explosives, and Other Related Materials—known as CIFTA (OAS, 1997). It 
was agreed at the outset of the negotiations on the Firearms Protocol that CIFTA 
should serve as the basic template for a new global treaty to combat firearms 
trafficking. Indeed, the General Assembly specifically recommended that the Ad 
Hoc Committee take CIFTA into account during negotiations ‘when appropriate 
and  pertinent’,  along  with  other  (unspecified)  international  instruments  and   
ongoing initiatives (UNGA, 1999d, para. 2).29
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The use of CIFTA as a starting point for the Firearms Protocol was not without 
its difficulties. While CIFTA includes explosives in its scope, states were divided 
on whether to do so in the Protocol, with Mexico, Spain, and Turkey calling for 
their inclusion, and the United States and much of the European Union against 
the proposal. Ultimately, the chair of the meeting distributed an opinion drafted 
by the UN Office of the Legal Counsel, which concluded that the mandate did 
not permit explosives in the text, partly because of an independent study of 
explosiv  es mandated by UN General Assembly Resolution 54/127.4 Despite 
objectio  ns that the resolution was not a sufficient substitute for including explos-
ives in the Protocol, and calls to expand the Ad Hoc Committee’s mandate, ref-
erences to explosives were deleted from the text.
Nevertheless, much of CIFTA proved extremely useful for the Firearms Pro-
tocol negotiations and improvements were made with respect to clarity and spe-
cificity. For example, the provision on maintaining records in CIFTA requires 
records to be maintained ‘for a reasonable time’ (OAS, 1997, art. XI), while the 
Protocol requires a time period of ‘not less than ten years’ (UNGA, 2001c, art. 7). 
Technical hurdles
The negotiations struggled with many of the technical issues inherent in impos-
ing legally binding obligations on commodities that are not considered contra-
band, in comparison to the ‘pure’ criminal activities addressed by UNTOC’s two 
other protocols (smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons). For example, 
during the final sessions, debate grew over how to address marking systems that 
were embedded with characters, symbols, and languages that were not legible to 
all investigators (such as Chinese symbols) and thus prevented successful tra-
cing of these weapons. As a compromise, the negotiators drafted a provision that 
allowed the continued use of such markings, provided that states that use them 
also use ‘a numeric and/or alphanumeric code, permitting ready identification 
by all States of the country of manufacture’ (UNGA, 2001c, art. 8.1(a)). As a result, 
states that use symbols or non-Western alphabets in their unique markings can 
4  In Resolution 54/127, the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General convene an 
expert group of no more than 20 members, with equitable geographical representation, to prepare 
a study on the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in explosives by criminals and their use for 
criminal purposes (UNGA, 1999d, para. 5).A
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‘maintain’ such a system, but they are not supposed to introduce such a marking 
system. In any case, they are to ensure that the country of manufacture is marked 
using a numeric or alphanumeric code.
The issue of how to mark firearms nearly derailed the Protocol negotiations, 
and deliberations over the marking provisions partly caused the delay in adopt-
ing the Firearms Protocol as compared to the other protocols.5 Indeed, when it 
adopted UNTOC and the two protocols in November 2000, the UN General As-
sembly made note of the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee had not yet completed 
its work on the draft Firearms Protocol and requested that it finalize such work 
‘as soon as possible’ (UNGA, 2000a, paras. 4–5).
A precedent is born
During the 12th session of the Ad Hoc Committee in February 2001, the draft 
protocol on firearms was completed and, at its 239th meeting on 2 March 2001, 
the Committee approved the final text. The Protocol was adopted by General 
Assembly Resolution 55/255 on 31 May 2001 (UNGA, 2001c, para. 2).
Over a decade after the negotiations were completed, the Firearms Protocol 
continues to lag behind in terms of ratifications when compared to its sister pro-
tocols and UNTOC.6 Nevertheless, the Protocol was a significant achievement in 
that it established illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms as criminal 
offences. It further identifies tracing and law enforcement cooperation as the 
primary tools to assist investigators and prosecutors in combating these crimes. 
Moreover, it was the first legally binding global instrument on small arms. 
5    The draft protocols on trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants were adopted by the Ad 
Hoc Committee in October 2000, while the Firearms Protocol was adopted in March 2001 (see Box 3).
6  As of April 2014, there were 179 states parties to UNTOC; 159 states parties to the Protocol on 
Trafficking in Persons; 138 states parties to the Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants; and 109 states 
parties to the Firearms Protocol. For current information, see UNODC (n.d.a).
The Firearms Protocol was the first legally binding global instrument on 
small arms. 
Note31
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Box 3 Firearms Protocol timeline 
21–23 November 1994  World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime: the 
possibility of an international instrument on transnational organized 
crime is considered (UNGA, 1994).
29 April–8 May 1995  The Ninth Congress is held in Cairo, Egypt, resulting in a push for a 
convention against organized transnational crime and consideration of 
firearms regulation (UNGA, 1995c).
24 July 1995  ECOSOC asks the Secretary-General to initiate a study on firearms 
regulation (ECOSOC, 1995, s. IV(A), paras. 7–8). 
7 March 1997  The UN international study on firearm regulation is published 
(ECOSOC, 1997).
28 July 1998  In Resolution 1998/18, ECOSOC recommends the elaboration of an 
internation  al instrument to combat the illicit manufacturing of and 
trafficking in firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition 
within the context of a UN convention against transnational organized 
crime (ECOSO  C, 1998, paras. 4, 7).
January 1999–July 2000  The Ad Hoc Committee7 holds ten sessions to draft a UN convention 
against transnational organized crime. 
28 July 2000  The Ad Hoc Committee approves the draft United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime at its tenth session (UNGA, 
2000b, para. 15).
29 October 2000  The Ad Hoc Committee approves the draft protocols on trafficking in 
persons and smuggling of migrants at its 11th session (UNGA, 2001d, 
paras. 16, 27).
15 November 2000  In Resolution 55/25, the General Assembly approves the texts of 
UNTOC and two draft protocols (UNGA, 2000a, para. 2).
12–15 December 2000  UNTOC and the two draft protocols are opened for signature.
2 March 2001  The Ad Hoc Committee approves the draft Firearms Protocol at its 12th 
session (UNGA, 2001e, para. 32).
31 May 2001   In Resolution 55/255, the General Assembly adopts the Firearms 
Protocol and opens it for signature (UNGA, 2001c).
29 September 2003  UNTOC enters into force.
3 July 2005  The Firearms Protocol enters into force.
7  The Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime was established by the General Assembly in 1999, mainly to draft a comprehensive inter-
national convention against transnational organized crime (UNGA, 1998b, para. 10). The Ad Hoc 
Committee held 12 sessions, meeting for a total of 239 times.A
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Purpose
The purpose of the Firearms Protocol is to:
promote, facilitate and strengthen cooperation among States Parties in order to 
prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in fire-
arms, their parts and components and ammunition (UNGA, 2001c, art. 2). 
The purpose of the Firearms Protocol must be understood and read in conjunc-
tion with the purpose of UNTOC, which is ‘to promote cooperation to prevent and 
combat transnational organized crime more effectively’ (UNGA, 2000a, art. 1).
Themes
At the heart of the Firearms Protocol is the need to prevent and control illicit 
activities commonly involving firearms that are associated with organized crime 
groups. The Protocol provides a framework for states parties to control and reg-
ulate legal arms and arms flows, prevent their diversion into the illicit market, 
and facilitate the investigation and prosecution of related offences. The instru-
ment provides for a comprehensive system to control the manufacture, import, 
export, and transit of firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition. 
The central premise holds that strong controls allow increased transparency and 
enhance the ability of states to target illicit transactions.
Main commitments
UNTOC provides a framework for law enforcement and judicial cooperation 
and includes mechanisms to support criminal investigations, such as mutual 
legal assistance and extradition. While UNTOC provides for basic measures to 
prevent and combat transnational organized crime, its protocols provide for 
measures to deal with specific crimes, and UNTOC must be read and applied in 
conjunction with its protocols. Parties to the Firearms Protocol undertake to   
adop  t and implement the strongest possible legislation, consistent with their   
national  legal  systems,  to  prevent,  investigate,  and  prosecute  the  offences   
stemming from the illicit manufacture of and trafficking in firearms. 
Table 1 lists central commitments of the Firearms Protocol that states   
parties must fulfil.33
T
h
e
 
F
i
r
e
a
r
m
s
 
P
r
o
t
o
c
o
l Table 1 Firearms Protocol provisions
Theme Firearms  
Protocol article
Provision
Criminalization 5 Establish criminal offences for: illicit manufacturing; illicit trafficking; and 
falsifying or illicitly obliterating, removing, or altering firearm markings. 
The deliberate removal of markings is also categorized as a criminal 
offence (UNGA, 2001c, art. 5(1)(c)).
Confiscation, 
seizure, and 
disposal
6 Adopt measures that enable states to confiscate, seize, and destroy illicitly 
manufactured or trafficked firearms, their parts and components, and 
ammunition, unless some other means of disposal is officially authorized 
and the firearms have been marked and the methods of disposal of the 
firearms and ammunition have been recorded.
Record-keeping 7 To enable tracing activities, maintain firearms-related records for at least 
ten years (and, if appropriate and feasible, information on parts and com-
ponents of firearms and ammunition). This information can include mark-
ings and details of transnational transfers, such as export licences granted.
Marking 8 Ensure that firearms are marked as follows:
  At the time of manufacture firearms must be marked with (a) a unique 
marking providing the name of the manufacturer, the country or place 
of manufacture, and the serial number, or (b) an alternative marking 
using simple geometric symbols in combination with a numeric and/
or alphanumeric code, permitting ready identification of the country 
of manufacture. 
Article 8 of the Protocol allows countries to use ‘geo-
metric’ as well as ‘alphanumeric’ symbols to mark their weapons.  
In the negotiations, China had pushed for the right to use geometric 
symbols, especially for purposes of identifying manufacturers. Many 
countries were extremely reluctant to concede to China on this 
issue. The exclusive use of alphanumeric markings would have  
ensure  d a high degree of transparency, enabling governments to 
trace weapons back to the manufacturer without the assistance of 
the original exporting government (McDonald, 2002, p. 240).
  Imported firearms must be marked so as to permit identification of 
the country of import and, whenever possible, the year of import, as 
well as a unique marking, if the firearm does not bear such a marking.   
There is no requirement to mark firearms that are impor-
ted into a country on a temporary basis.
  At the time of transfer from government stockpiles to permanent 
civilian use firearms must be marked in a way that permits identifi-
cation of the transferring country. States parties must also encourage 
the firearms manufacturing industry to develop measures against the 
removal or alteration of markings.
If a firearm is recovered from a crime scene or in the course of 
illicit manufacturing or trafficking, its markings can be used by 
the investigating state to search its own records and as a basis for 
an international request for the tracing of that firearm.
What is the purpose of marking?
Note
NoteA
 
D
i
p
l
o
m
a
t
’
s
 
G
u
i
d
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
U
N
 
S
m
a
l
l
 
A
r
m
s
 
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
H
a
n
d
b
o
o
k
34
Deactivation of 
firearms
9 If national law does not recognize a deactivated firearm as a ‘firearm’, take 
measures to prevent the illicit reactivation of firearms, including by: establish-
ing relevant criminal offences (such as illicit reactivation or inadequate  
deactivatio  n); ensuring that deactivation involves rendering all essential parts 
permanently inoperable and incapable of reactivation; and officially verifying 
that the firearm has been deactivated and that the firearm is marked in a way 
that confirms it has been deactivated.
In their national laws regulating firearms, most states 
include a definition of a ‘firearm’. In some countries, the definition is 
drafted in such a way that it includes only functioning firearms—that 
is, those capable of expelling a projectile. This means, for example, 
that antique firearms or deactivated firearms that form part of a 
museu  m collection may not be covered by the legislation; con-
sequently, there is no requirement to hold a licence for such firearms 
or to store them in a secure way. However, it may be possible to 
alter—or reactivate—such firearms so that they are capable of  
expellin  g a projectile. 
Export 10(1) Establish or maintain an effective system of export licensing or  
authorization     for the transfer of firearms, their parts and components,  
and ammunition.
10(2) Before issuing export licences or authorizations, verify that importing 
states have issued import licences or authorizations and transit states have 
given notice in writing that they have no objection to the transit.
10(3) Ensure that the export licence or authorization and accompanying docu-
mentation contain information on: place and the date of issuance, the 
date of expiration, the country of export, the country of import, the final 
recipient, a description and the quantity of the firearms, their parts and 
components, and ammunition, and, if applicable, the countries of transit. 
The information contained in the import licence must be provided to the 
transit states in advance.
10(5) Ensure that licensing or authorization procedures are secure and that the 
authenticity of relevant documents can be verified or validated.
Import 10(1) Establish or maintain a system of import licensing or authorization for the 
transfer of firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition.
10(3) Ensure that the import licence or authorization and accompanying docu-
mentation contain information on: place and the date of issuance, the 
date of expiration, the country of export, the country of import, the final 
recipient, a description and the quantity of the firearms, their parts and 
components, and ammunition, and, if applicable, the countries of transit. 
The information contained in the import licence must be provided to the 
transit states in advance.
10(4) Upon request, inform the exporting state of the receipt of the dispatched 
shipment.
Transit 10(1) Establish or maintain measures on international transit for the transfer of 
firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition.
Note
Theme Firearm Protocol 
article
Provision35
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Information 
exchange
12 Exchange relevant case-specific information and cooperate in tracing 
with other states parties, in line with their domestic legal and administrat-
ive systems; shared information can cover aspects such as known traffick-
ing routes or organized criminal groups involved in trafficking.
Cooperation 13 Cooperate at the bilateral, regional, and international levels to prevent, 
combat, and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in fire-
arms, their parts and components, and ammunition.
Brokering 15 Consider establishing a system for regulating brokers that could include 
one or more of the following measures: registration of brokers operating 
within their territory; licensing or authorization of brokering; and disclos-
ure of the names and locations of brokers involved in import and export 
licences or accompanying documents. 
Brokering provisions are recommended rather  
than mandatory.
Note
Scope
State-to-state transfers. The Protocol does not apply to state-to-state transactions 
(UNGA, 2001c, art. 4(2)). During the negotiations, states favouring the inclusion 
of such transfers argued that they were just as susceptible to diversion to the il-
licit market and should thus be subject to the same restrictions as commercial 
sales. States opposing their inclusion argued that it would broaden the scope of 
the Protocol too far and risk taking the negotiations into sensitive territory linked 
to national security concerns. The latter view prevailed (McDonald, 2002, p. 239).
What is a state-to-state transfer? 
State-to-state (or government-to-government) transfers involve the sale of small 
arms by the government of an exporting state to the government of an importing 
state for use by its defence or security forces. These arms may be procured from 
the surplus stockpiles of the exporting government; they may be produced by a 
state-owned company; or the exporting government may procure them on 
behalf of the importing government from a private arms-manufacturing com-
pany operating in the exporting state. 
Private manufacturers in an exporting state engage in commercial sales when 
they sell their small arms to an entity in a foreign country. That entity could be a 
government or a firearms dealer in the importing state (Parker, 2009, p. 64). If a 
government transfers small arms to a private individual or company, it is 
carrying out a state-to-private-end-user transfer.
What transfers are not state-to-state?
Theme Firearm Protocol 
article
ProvisionA
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Transfers to non-state actors. The Protocol does not apply to ‘state transfers 
in cases where the application of the Protocol would prejudice the right of a State 
Party to take action in the interest of national security consistent with the Charter 
of the United Nations’ (UNGA, 2001c, art. 4(2)). Negotiating states diverged 
sharply in their views on whether to apply the Protocol to transfers of firearms 
from states to non-state actors. They eventually agreed on compromise language 
in Article 4.2 that allows states parties to decide for themselves whether a spe-
cific  transfer  from  the  state  to  a  non-state  actor  is  covered  by  the  Protocol   
(McDonald, 2002, pp. 239–40). 
The Firearms Protocol process
Conference of the Parties
A Conference of the Parties to the Convention, established pursuant to Article 32 
of UNTOC, promotes and reviews the implementation of the Convention and its 
protocols, including the Firearms Protocol. To date, the Conference has held six 
regular sessions in Vienna—in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012; the next 
Conference is scheduled to take place in the second half of 2014.8 
Secretariat
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is the Secretariat of the Confer-
ence of the Parties to UNTOC and its protocols. Pursuant to Article 33 of   
UNTO  C, the Secretariat’s roles are to:
  assist the Conference of the Parties in carrying out its activities and support 
Conference sessions;
  upon request, assist states parties in providing information on their imple-
mentation;9 and
  ensure the necessary coordination with the secretariats of relevant inter-
national and regional organizations.
8  Session reports are available at UNODC (n.d.c).
9  A self-assessment software tool has been created to assist states parties in submitting information; 
see UNODC (n.d.d). 37
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The Conference of the Parties to UNTOC established an open-ended intergov-
ernmental working group on firearms in 2010 to advise and assist the Confer-
ence in the implementation of its mandate with regard to the Firearms Protocol 
(UN CTOC, 2010, res. 5/4, para. 8). The first two meetings of the working group 
on firearms took place in Vienna, the first from 21 to 22 May 2012 and the second 
from 26 to 28 May 2014.
Relationship to the PoA
The process of developing the Firearms Protocol ran parallel to the work leading 
to the UN small arms conference in July 2001. Indeed, the UN small arms confer-
ence opened a few weeks after the Protocol was adopted.
The drafters of the Firearms Protocol were determined to keep the instru-
ment focused on crime prevention and law enforcement.11 Many supporters 
wanted to steer the negotiations clear of issues that they considered arms control 
rather than crime control measures. They feared that a comprehensive agree-
ment would be weaker and less enforceable. Towards the end of the negoti-
ations, many countries looked to the upcoming UN small arms conference as a 
more suitable forum for discussion of the more sensitive issues. As a result, the 
Firearms Protocol is limited in scope and content. 
In laying the groundwork for the UN small arms conference (see Part 2.2), 
the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) appointed to develop the framework 
for the conference noted that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons 
was closely linked to the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer 
of such arms. The group argued that: 
the scope of the Conference should therefore not be limited to criminal breaches of 
existing arms legislation and export/import controls but consideration should be 
given to all relevant factors leading to the excessive and destabilizing accumula-
tion of small arms and light weapons in the context of the illicit arms trade 
(UNGA, 1999a, para. 132). 
10  For a full list of working groups established by the Conference on other issues, see UNODC (n.d.e).
11  This was consistent with the Firearms Protocol drafters’ use of CIFTA as their model (OAS, 1997; 
see ‘History’, above).A
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Since the Protocol already focused on combating and preventing illicit traf-
ficking in small arms, calls for the UN small arms conference to do the same 
were significantly weakened. 
Nevertheless, effective implementation and further development of the PoA 
and the Firearms Protocol have been closely linked. They feature many of the 
same measures, including ones that call on states to share information to facili-
tate  identification  of  groups  involved  in  trafficking  and  illicit  manufacture,   
ensure arms are adequately marked and records kept, and establish effective 
licensin    g systems and transfer controls. At a more general level, there are   
intrinsic links between the issues of crime prevention, security, and disarma-
ment that underpin both instruments (Greene, 2001).
Resources
UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 2004a. Legislative Guides for the Implementation 
of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto. 
<http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ATTPrepCom/Background%20documents/
Legislative%20guide%20-%20E.pdf>
—. 2011. ‘Model Law against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and 
Components and Ammunition.’ <http://www.unodc.org/documents/legal-tools/Model_Law_
Firearms_Final.pdf>
Quick reference
The text of UNTOC and its three protocols is available here: 
 <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/>
The text of the Firearms Protocol is available here: 
 <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/255e.pdf>
UNODC maintains a website providing information on the Firearms Protocol and firearms-related 
activities: 
  <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/introduction.html>
The United Nations treaty collection maintains an updated list of states that have signed, ratified, 
accepted, approved, acceded to, and succeeded to the Firearms Protocol: 
 <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-c&chapter 
=18&lang=en>39
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2.2 The Programme of Action 
Background
The Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects—known as the Programme of 
Action, or PoA—establishes a normative framework for small arms control and 
covers a broad spectrum of issue areas and activities. 
Agreed to by all participants of a UN small arms conference held in July 2001, 
the PoA is a politically binding set of global commitments that provides UN 
member states with a mandate to develop and implement practical measures to 
curb the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons at the global, regional, and 
national levels. 
History
The emergence of small arms on the international disarmament agenda
The emergence of the problem of small arms and light weapons onto the inter-
national agenda must be seen in the context of the international environment of 
the early 1990s. Following the end of the cold war, the international community 
began to focus its attention on internal rather than inter-state conflicts, particu-
larly through UN activities around the world. 
One result was a growing awareness of the pervasiveness and role of small 
arms and light weapons in conflict. This shift is evidenced in the UN Secretary- 
General’s 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, in which he explicitly draws 
attention to the need for ‘micro-disarmament’ efforts, meaning:
practical  disarmament  in  the  context  of  the  conflicts  the  United  Nations  is   
actuall  y dealing with and of the weapons, most of them light weapons, that are 
actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands (UNGA, 1995a, para. 60).
The initial task of defining the problems associated with small arms and   
light weapons fell to the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms.   A
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The Panel addressed the following issues: 
  the types of small arms and light weapons used in conflicts being dealt with 
by the United Nations; 
  the nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and 
transfer of small arms and light weapons; and 
  the ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilizing 
accu  mulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons (UNGA, 1995b, 
para. 1). 
Among its recommendations, the Panel called for an ‘international confer-
ence on the illicit arms trade in all its aspects, based on the issues identified in the 
present repor  t’ (UNGA, 1997a, para. 80(k)). In response, the UN General Assem-
bly called for an examinati  on of member states’ views on the Panel’s proposal 
and for a GGE to develop the framework of such a conference (UNGA, 1997b) 
and in 1998 announced its decision ‘to convene an international conference on 
the illicit trade in all its aspects’ (UNGA, 1998a, para. 1). The GGE met from May 
1998 to August 1999, partly to develop the recommendations of the Panel and to 
make further recommendations in its 1999 report (UNGA, 1999a).
Several developments served to buttress efforts to convene an international 
conference. First, the successful conclusion of the Anti-personnel Mine Ban   
Conventio  n in late 1997 gave rise to a new sense of what was possible in relation 
to multilateral action on conventional weapons. Second, regional organizations 
were increasingly active on small arms issues, with several having adopted   
regional instruments on the issue prior to the UN conference.12 Third, new   
Comprising representatives of European Union states, the United States, 
China, and key members of the Non-Aligned Movement, the GGE largely reflected the 
composition of the UN itself. Its debates in 1998–99 thus provided an accurate 
preview of the difficulties that would dominate the UN small arms conference two 
years later.
Note
12  Regional organizations produced a number of agreements, including the Southern Africa   
Regional Action Programme on Light Arms and Illicit Arms Trafficking (1998), the Organization for 
Securit  y and Co-operation in Europe’s Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000), the 
Organization of African Unity’s Bamako Declaration (2000), and the European Union’s Plan of 
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in 
All Its Aspects (2000), building on its earlier Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (1998) and Joint 
Action on Small Arms (1998).41
initiative  s were emerging largely out of concern about the relationship between 
illicit firearms and criminality.13 Fourth, civil society organizations had begun to 
play a crucial role in getting the issue of small arms and light weapons on the 
international agenda; they were spearheading efforts to understand the small 
arms problem from the human rights, development, and humanitarian perspect-
ives. With the formation of the International Action Network on Small Arms 
(IANSA) in the late 1990s, the emerging UN process gained a dedicated civil so-
ciety interlocutor. Other civil society groups, including the World Forum on the 
Future of Sport Shooting Activities, also weighed in with their views, especially 
with respect to firearms marking. 
Anticipating the UN small arms conference
The idea of an international small arms conference was by no means uncontro-
versial. A fear that the outcome might somehow limit the ability to import 
weapons was of particular concern to some developing countries that lacked the 
capacity to manufacture arms; the United States was wary with respect to do-
mestic issues, such as the question of civilia  n possession. Meanwhile, Canada 
and European Union members saw the conference as a chance to develop inter-
national norms in an area where few existed. In contrast, Australia, New Zeal-
and, and South Africa held that the issue was not ripe for positive international 
action, arguing that the conference might distract from or even undermine pos-
itive steps that were already being taken at the national and regional levels.
This range of perspectives echoed the broad differences that had run through 
the deliberations of the Panel of Experts and the GGE with respect to the scope 
of any proposed action in relation to the ‘illicit trade’, including the degree to 
which the legal trade itself must be considered in the process. The GGE, for in-
stance, had argued:
The scope of the Conference should […] not be limited to criminal breaches of 
existing arms legislation and export/import controls but consideration should be 
given to all relevant factors leading to the excessive and destabilizing accumu-
lation of small arms and light weapons in the context of the illicit arms trade 
(UNGA, 1999a, para. 132; emphasis added). 
13  These initiatives resulted in the 1997 CIFTA agreement and in the legally binding Firearms Pro-
tocol of 2001. See Part 2.1 for more details.
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Debate over how to identify the ‘relevant factors’ shaped the outcome of the 
UN small arms conference.
The UN small arms conference unfolds
The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All 
Its Aspects was held on 9–20 July 2001 in New York. It was preceded, in 2000 and 
2001, by three meetings of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), which out-
lined the basic elements of a PoA (see Box 4). 
Box 4 PoA timeline 
12 December 1995  In Resolution 50/70B, the UN General Assembly asks the Secretary- 
General to prepare a report on small arms with the assistance of a 
panel of governmental experts (UNGA, 1995b).
June 1996–August 1997   The Panel of Experts completes its report, recommending that the UN 
consider holding ‘an international conference on the illicit arms trade 
in all its aspects, based on the issues identified in the present report’ 
(UNGA, 1997a, para. 80(k)).
9 December 1997  In Resolution 52/38J, the General Assembly asks the Secretary-Gen-
eral to seek the views of member states on convening a conference, 
and to prepare a second report on small arms with the assistance of a 
GGE (UNGA, 1997b).
May 1998–August 1999   The GGE produces a report addressing the objectives, scope, agenda, 
dates, and venue of the UN small arms conference (UNGA, 1999a).
15 December 1999  In Resolution 54/54V, the General Assembly launches the last stages 
of the UN small arms conference process (UNGA, 1999c).
28 February–3 March 2000  The first PrepCom is held.
8–19 January 2001  The second PrepCom is held.
19–30 March 2001  The third PrepCom begins negotiating the PoA.
9 July 2001  The UN small arms conference begins.
21 July 2001  Conference participants agree on a consensus PoA (UNGA, 2001a).
24 December 2001   The General Assembly welcomes the adoption of the PoA by 
consensus and calls upon states to implement it. It also decides to 
hold the first biennial meeting in 2003, and to convene the first 
conference to review implementation of the PoA no later than 2006 
(UNGA, 2001b).
Source: Laurance (2002, p. 204)
By the time the UN small arms conference opened, parts of the provisional 
PoA seemed to enjoy consensus. A range of key issues remained contested, how-
ever, including:  43
  language on human rights and international humanitarian law violations 
resulting from the excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons; 
  links between the illicit trade and the legitimate rights of states to buy and 
sell weapons; 
  civilian possession of firearms; 
  the unauthorized transfer of firearms to non-state actors and broader issues 
of export controls; 
  the extent of measures on marking and tracing and on brokering; and 
  follow-up mechanisms such as review processes and national reporting.
States set themselves the goal of achieving a consensus document at the UN 
small arms conference, a move that would inevitably lead to a narrowing and 
watering down of the PoA. That the negotiations would be difficult was sig-
nalled on the first day of the UN small arms conference, for example when the 
United States opened by laying down a number of ‘red lines’, indicating its re-
fusal to accep  t provisions that would, among other things, constrain the legal 
trade and legal manufacturing of small arms and light weapons, prohibit civil-
ian possession of small arms, or limit trade in small arms and light weapons 
solely to governments. 
By the final day of the UN small arms conference, serious compromise was 
required by participating states. In the end, the United States succeeded in de-
feating the inclusion of language on civilian ownership and supplying non-state 
actors. China and a number of other states rejected any reference to human rights 
violations, with the result that no such language made it into the PoA. While 
many states had hoped to address the small arms issue as more than a narrowly 
defined arms control problem, the PoA largely confines non-arms control dimen-
sions to its preamble. The Arab Group in particular showed opposition to refer-
ences to the ‘excessive and destabilizing accumulation’ of small arms and light 
weapons, fearing possible implications for the legal trade; the term was thus con-
fined to the preamble and did not appear in the measures section, where the term 
‘illicit trade’ was used. Consequently, the PoA neither mentions nor alludes to 
the concept of restraint in the legal acquisition or export of such weapons. 
Attempts to establish a clear timeframe for the review of PoA implementa-
tion were whittled down, as were proposals that would have allowed the review 
process to develop existing PoA measures and consider new ones. Further 
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compromis  es were made on language in the follow-up provisions that would 
have mandated negotiations towards legally binding instruments on marking 
and tracing and on brokering; instead, the PoA simply called for a UN study on 
the feasibility of a marking and tracing instrument (see Part 2.3) and asked states 
to consider ways to enhance cooperation in the control of illicit brokering 
(UNGA, 2001a, paras. IV(1)(c)–(d)).
The resulting PoA was therefore considerably weaker than many had antici-
pated, but the conference had succeeded in adopting the PoA by consensus. 
Relevant factors 
In understanding the small arms process, it is helpful to consider the issue of 
ammunition, the role of civil society, and the suitability of the arms control ap-
proach to addressing the issue.
Ammunition. The PoA contains no specific reference to the issue of ammuni-
tion. The word appears only twice, both times in connection with titles of other 
UN documents.14 In 1997, the Panel of Experts had acknowledged that ‘[a]mmu-
nition and explosives form an integral part of the small arms and light weapons 
used in conflicts’ and recommended that the UN prepare a study on ‘all aspects 
of the problem of ammunition and explosives’ (1997a, paras. 29, 80(m)). Yet the 
association of ammunition with ‘explosives’ obscured the intrinsic connection 
between small arms and their ammunition, and thus ‘contributed to rele  gating 
consideration of ammunition to a somewhat peripheral rank in [small arms and 
light weapons] discussions and negotiations’ (Carle, 2006, p. 50).15
The reluctance to confront the issue of ammunition also characterized sub-
sequent efforts to develop multilateral marking and tracing commitments, such 
as the International Tracing Instrument (see Part 2.3). 
14  The two UN documents are the Firearms Protocol (UNGA, 2001c) and the report of the Secret-
ary-General entitled Methods of Destruction of Small Arms, Light Weapons, Ammunition and Explos-
ives (UNSC, 2000). 
15  Tasked with developing the concept for the 2001 UN small arms conference, the GGE did take 
note of a UN ammunition study and recommended that ammunition be considered (UNGA, 
1999a, para. 130). The GGE did not make any reference to explosives, thereby offering ‘some 
implicit admission that while ammunition and [small arms and light weapons] formed a natural 
pair, ammunition and explosives did not’ and acknowledging that ‘there would be even greater 
resistance to dealing with illicit cartridges and bullets than with uncontrolled [small arms and 
light weapons]’ (Carle, 2006, p. 50).45
Civil society. While civil society played an important role in bringing the 
small arms problem to the international agenda, two factors limited its involve-
ment during the UN small arms conference. 
The first relates to access and the level of participation of non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Some states perceived NGOs as important sources of 
informati  on, and several had NGO representatives on their delegations; in con-
trast, others wished to restrict NGO access for fear they would highlight human 
rights and other issues. NGO participation was thus limited to one conference 
session, during which a range of NGOs were allowed to address the plenary. Yet 
NGOs also provided a range of informal contributions to the UN small arms 
conference, such as IANSA’s daily report on the proceedings. 
The second factor is more fundamental. Unlike during the landmines pro-
cess, the ‘voice’ of civil society on the small arms issue was, and remains, a di-
vided one. Throughout the preparatory process and during the UN small arms 
conference itself, two distinct NGO communities were at work. One was a broad 
coalition of groups working to control the proliferation of small arms and their 
effects, brought together under the umbrella of IANSA; the second group rep-
resented the gun rights community, which saw the UN small arms conference as 
a threat to the rights of gun owners and sports shooters. 
Arms control vs. other approaches. Although the issue of small arms and 
light weapons gained prominence based on a desire to reduce the effects of 
armed violence on individuals, communities, and societies, resulting control 
effor  ts were subsumed into the framework of arms control and disarmament—
rather than human rights and development. This framing eventually pushed out 
the ‘soft’ questions, such as human rights, development impacts, and humanit-
arian effects—and criminality was largely being dealt with elsewhere. 
The fact that the focus in the late 1990s was on the instrument of violence 
rather than on the violence itself probably made the arms control approach 
inevitab  le. With time, the emerging focus on demand factors and on causal 
factors of armed violence may usher in more holistic approaches to addressing 
the problems posed by small arms (see Part 2.4).
T
h
e
 
P
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
 
o
f
 
A
c
t
i
o
n
 A
 
D
i
p
l
o
m
a
t
’
s
 
G
u
i
d
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
U
N
 
S
m
a
l
l
 
A
r
m
s
 
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
H
a
n
d
b
o
o
k
46
Purpose 
The PoA aims to reduce the human suffering caused by the illicit trade in small 
arms, largely by addressing the manufacture, transfer, and storage of small 
arms, as well as their excessive accumulation, which has wide-ranging human-
itarian and socio-economic consequences.
As its title suggests, the PoA seeks to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illi-
cit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects by:
(a)   strengthening or developing agreed norms and measures at the global, re-
gional, and national levels to address the illicit trade;
(b)   developing and implementing agreed international measures to address illi-
ci  t manufacturing and trafficking;
(c)  emphasizing  post-conflict  situations  and  regions  facing  urgent  problems 
with respect to excessive and destabilizing accumulations of small arms and 
light weapons; 
(d) mobilizing the political will throughout the international community to pre-
vent and combat illicit transfers and manufacturing and to raise awareness 
of the interrelated problems associated with these activities; and
(e) promoting responsible action by states to prevent illicit transfers (UNGA, 
2001a, para. I.22).
Themes
Through a series of specific provisions, the PoA places the primary responsibility 
for curbing the illicit trade in small arms on governments. These provisions 
concer    n issues such as national controls on production and transfers; criminal 
offence    s; marking, record-keeping, and tracing; stockpile management; surplus dis-
posal; brokering controls; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); 
public awareness programmes; and international cooperation and assistance. 
Main commitments
As shown in Table 2, the PoA calls on states to establish or strengthen various 
measures to tackle the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.47
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Table 2 PoA provisions
Theme PoA section  Provision
National coordination 
agency
II.4 Establish or designate national coordination agencies responsible for 
policy guidance, research, and monitoring efforts.
National point of 
contact
II.5 Establish or designate a national point of contact to act as a liaison 
between states.
Manufacture II.2 Put in place adequate laws, regulations, and administrative procedures to 
exercise effective control over the production of small arms and light weapons.
II.3 Establish illegal manufacture as a criminal offence.
II.6 Identify and take legal action against persons involved in illegal manufacture.
Marking II.7 Apply appropriate and reliable marking—identifying country of manufac-
ture, manufacturer, and serial number—on each small arm and light 
weapon as an integral part of the production process.
II.8 Adopt measures to prevent the manufacture, stockpiling, transfer, and 
possession of unmarked or inadequately marked small arms and  
light weapons.
Record-keeping II.9 Ensure comprehensive and accurate records on manufacture, holding, 
and transfer of small arms and light weapons and ensure that they are 
kept for as long as possible.
II.16 Ensure that confiscated, seized, and collected weapons are marked and 
registered, if they are not destroyed.
Cooperation in tracing II.10 Ensure effective measures for tracing weapons held and issued by the state.
Export II.2, II.12 Put in place adequate laws, regulations, and administrative procedures to 
exercise effective control over the export, import, transit, and retransfer of 
small arms and light weapons.
II.11 Assess export applications according to strict national regulations and 
procedures that are consistent with international law and that take into 
account the risk of diversion.
II.11 Establish an effective system of export and import licensing or authoriza-
tion as well as measures on international transit.
II.12 Ensure the use of authenticated end-user certificates and establish effect-
ive legal and enforcement measures.
Import II.2, II.12 Put in place adequate laws, regulations, and administrative procedures to 
exercise effective control over the export, import, transit, and retransfer of 
small arms and light weapons.
II.11 Establish an effective system of export and import licensing or authoriza-
tion as well as measures on international transit.
II.12 Ensure the use of authenticated end-user certificates and establish effect-
ive legal and enforcement measures.
Transit II.2, II.12 Put in place adequate laws, regulations, and administrative procedures to 
exercise effective control over the export, import, transit, and retransfer of 
small arms and light weapons.
II.11 Establish an effective system of export and import licensing or authoriza-
tion as well as measures on international transit.A
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Retransfer II.2, II.12 Put in place adequate laws, regulations, and administrative procedures to 
exercise effective control over the export, import, transit, and retransfer of 
small arms and light weapons.
II.11 Assess export applications according to strict national regulations and 
procedures that are consistent with international law and that take into 
account the risk of diversion.
II.11 Establish an effective system of export and import licensing authorization as 
well as measures on international transit.
II.12 Ensure the use of authenticated end-user certificates and establish effect-
ive legal and enforcement measures.
II.13 Notify the original exporting states before the retransfer of weapons, in 
accordance with bilateral agreements.
General II.3 Establish illegal trade as a criminal offence.
II.6 Identify and take legal action against persons involved in illegal trade  
or transfers.
II.15 Take appropriate measures, including legal and administrative measures, 
against activities that violate arms embargoes.
Brokering II.14 Develop legislation and administrative procedures on brokering, includ-
ing on the registration of brokers and the licensing or authorization of 
brokering transactions, and appropriate penalties for illicit brokering.
II.6 Identify and take legal action against persons involved in illegal financing 
for acquisition.
Collection, seizure, 
and disposal
II.16 Destroy confiscated, seized, and collected small arms and light weapons, 
unless another use has been officially authorized.
Stockpile manage-
ment and security
II.17 Ensure the establishment of adequate and detailed standards and procedure  s 
for the management and security of stockpiles held by any authorized body.
II.3 Establish illicit stockpiling as a criminal offence.
Surplus identification 
and disposal
II.18 Perform regular reviews of stockpiles held by armed forces, police, and 
other authorized bodies to identify surplus. 
 
 
 
II.18 Ensure that declared surplus stockpiles are clearly identified and disposed 
of, preferably through destruction, and ensure adequate safeguarding 
until disposal.
II.19 Take into account the Secretary-General’s report on destruction methods 
(UNSC, 2000).
Theme PoA section  Provision
Surplus is the quantity of arms that exceeds the requirements of 
state defence and security forces. It is up to national 
governments to determine how to identify or calculate surplus 
stockpiles, there being no international definition of surplus.16 
What is surplus?  
16  Although there is no standard definition, some instruments—such as the Organization for Secur-
ity and Co-operation in Europe’s Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons—outline indicat-
ors for identifying surplus (OSCE, 2000, s. IV(A)).49
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Public awareness II.20 Develop and implement public awareness and confidence-building 
programmes, in cooperation with civil society. 
DDR and children II.21 Develop and implement effective DDR programmes.
II.21 If a method other than destruction is officially authorized, ensure that 
small arms and light weapons are marked and the alternate form of 
disposal is recorded.
II.21 Include specific provisions for DDR programmes in peace agreements.
II.22 Address special needs of children affected by armed conflict.
Transparency II.23 Make public relevant national laws, regulations, and procedures.
II.23 Submit to regional and international organizations information on small 
arms and light weapons confiscated or destroyed and other relevant in-
formation (such as illicit trade routes and techniques of acquisition).
Other (possession, 
stockpiling, and trade)
II.3 Establish the illegal possession, stockpiling, and trade of small arms and 
light weapons as criminal offences.
II.6 Identify groups and individuals engaged in the illegal possession, stock-
piling, and trade of small arms and light weapons.
Regional measures II.25 Encourage, conclude, ratify, or fully implement relevant legally binding 
instruments aimed at addressing the illicit trade.
II.26 Encourage the establishment and strengthening of moratoria on the trans-
fer and manufacture of small arms and light weapons in affected regions.
II.27 Establish trans-border cooperation and information sharing between law 
enforcement and customs control agencies.
II.29 Promote safe and effective stockpile management, support DDR pro-
grammes, and encourage measures to enhance transparency.
Global measures II.32 Cooperate with the UN to ensure effective implementation of arms  
embargoes.
II.34 Encourage DDR and weapons disposal programmes.
II.36 Strengthen states’ abilities to cooperate in identifying and tracing small 
arms and light weapons.
II.37 Encourage cooperation with the International Criminal Police Organiza-
tion (INTERPOL).
II.39 Develop a common understanding of the scope and issues of illicit 
brokering.
II.40 Encourage cooperation with relevant regional and international  
organizations and civil society, including NGOs.
International cooper-
ation and assistance
III Undertake to cooperate and coordinate efforts to combat the illicit trade 
in small arms, and to offer financial and technical assistance, if in a posi-
tion to do so, to support the effective implementation of the PoA.
Theme PoA section  ProvisionA
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Box 5 Schedule of PoA meetings, 2012–18
2014  BMS5 (one week)
2015  Open-ended meeting of governmental experts (one week)
2016  BMS6 (one week)
2018  Third Review Conference (two weeks, preceded by a one-week PrepCom)
Source: UNGA (2012a, annexe III, paras. 1–2)
The PoA process
The PoA calls on states to:
  submit national reports on their implementation of the PoA on a voluntary 
basis, which states tend to do every two years, to coincide with each biennial 
meeting of states (BMS);
  convene biennial meetings to consider national, regional, and global imple-
mentation of the PoA; and
  convene a review conference by 2006 to evaluate progress made in the imple-
mentation of the PoA. The first such conference was held in 2006 in accordance 
with the PoA (UNGA, 2001a, part IV). UN member states agreed to convene a 
second review conference in 2012 through General Assembly Resolution 
63/72 (UNGA, 2008e, para. 14). A third is scheduled for 2018 (see Box 5).
Evolution of the PoA and its relationship to other instruments
While many of the PoA provisions are crafted in fairly general language, bench-
marks  for  assessing  PoA  implementation  efforts  are  evolving.  Since  the 
Programm  e’s adoption in 2001, its provisions have been supplemented and ex-
pande  d through the following: 
  the International Tracing Instru  ment, or ITI (UNGA, 2005b); 
Note While the PoA itself makes provisions for a five-year cycle (with the first 
biennial meeting in 2003, the second in 2005, and the first review conference in 
2006), states have since agreed to follow a six-year cycle. The need for this change 
was recognized by states during the fourth Biennial Meeting of States (BMS4), as 
reflected in its outcome document (UNGA, 2010, para. 44). The schedule of meetings 
for the six-year cycle from 2012 to 2018 was determined during the Second Review 
Conference in 2012 (see Box 5).51
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  the report of the Group of 
Governmental Experts on 
Brokering (UNGA, 2007a);
  the outcome documents of 
BMS3 and BMS4 (UNGA, 
2008a; 2010); 
  the chair’s summary of the 
Open-ended Meeting of 
Governmental Experts in 
2011 (UNGA, 2011); and
  the outcome document of 
the Second Review Con-
ference (UNGA, 2012a; see 
Figure 12). 
There are areas of overlap 
between the PoA and the 
Fire  arms Protocol; the provi-
sions of the Arms Trade 
Treaty also supplement and 
expand on PoA provisions 
that relate to international 
transfer controls (export, im-
port, transit, and retransfer) 
and brokering (see Parts 2.1 
and 2.5). States parties to 
these instruments should be 
attentive to parallel commit-
ments that exist. In addition, 
recent regional agreements 
contribute to commitments 
in this area. Accordingly, the 
PoA should not be read—or 
implemented—as a stand-
alone text.
Figure 12 Evolution of PoA themes
PROGRAMME OF ACTION (2001)
Manufacture
Marking, record-keeping, and tracing
International Tracing Instrument (2005) 
BMS3 outcome document (2008)
BMS4 outcome document (2010)
Open-ended Meeting of  
Governmental Experts (2011)
Stockpile management and surplus disposal
BMS3 outcome document (2008)
Collection and destruction
International transfers
Arms Trade Treaty (2013) 
Arms Trade Treaty (2013) 
Brokering
Group of Governmental Experts  
on Brokering (2008) 
BMS3 outcome document (2008)
Public awareness
Disarmament, demobilization,  
and reintegration
International cooperation and assistance
BMS3 outcome document (2008)
BMS4 outcome document (2010)
Second Review Conference  
outcome document (2012)
Second Review Conference  
outcome document (2012) A
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Resources
Borrie, John. 2006. ‘Small Arms and the Geneva Forum: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action?’ In 
John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin, eds. Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: From Perspect-
ive to Practice. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, pp. 137–65.
Carle, Christophe. 2006. ‘Small Arms Ammunition: Light at the End of the Barrel?’ Disarmament 
Forum, No. 1, pp. 49–54.
Laurance, Ed. 2002. ‘Reaching Consensus in New York: The UN 2001 Small Arms Conference.’ In 
Small Arms Survey. Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 203–33.
Quick reference
The text of the PoA is available here: 
 <http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/poahtml.aspx>
UNODA’s Programme of Action Implementation Support System (PoA–ISS) is an online resource 
that provides information on the PoA process: 
 <http://www.poa-iss.org/poa/poa.aspx>
2.3 The International Tracing Instrument
Background
The International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely 
and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons—known as the 
Internatio  nal Tracing Instrument, or ITI—is a politically binding instrument 
adopte    d by UN member states in 2005. The ITI grew out of efforts to promote the 
development of international marking, record-keeping, and tracing measures. 
History17
Attention to the tracing issue
The marking and tracing of small arms received heightened international atten-
tion in the late 1990s, with the recommendation of the UN Panel of Experts for a 
study on marking and the adoption of standards for marking, record-keeping, 
17  This section draws on the overview of the ITI negotiations in McDonald (2006).53
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and tracin  g by the Organization of American States (UNGA, 1997a, para. 80(l)(i); 
OAS, 1997). France and Switzerland launched their own initiative in this area in 
2000 (France and Switzerland, 2000; 2001a; 2001b). This initiative and inputs 
from civil society groups, both pro-control and pro-gun, fed into preparations 
for the 2001 UN small arms conference (see Part 2.2). The PoA, agreed at the 
conference, recommended in its follow-up section that the UN study ‘the feasi-
bility of developing’ an international tracing instrument (UNGA, 2001a,   
s. IV.1.c). This was a compromise that fell well short of the prompt commence-
ment of negotiations on an international instrument, in particular a treaty, that 
many states at the conference had advocated.
The Group of Governmental Experts on Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light 
Weapons was established to conduct the feasibility study recommended by the 
PoA. The GGE held three meetings between July 2002 and June 2003, and issued 
its report in July 2003 (UNGA, 2003a). In its report, the GGE concluded that it 
was both ‘desirable’ and ‘feasible’ to develop an international tracing instrument 
and recommended that the General Assembly take a decision to negotiate such 
an instrument within the UN framework. 
Pursuant to the GGE’s recommendation, the UN General Assembly had es-
tablished an open-ended working group (OEWG) ‘to negotiate an international 
instrument to enable States to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, 
illicit small arms and light weapons’ (UNGA, 2003b, para. 8). The OEWG nego-
tiated over the course of three two-week sessions (see Box 6), reaching consensus 
agreement on a draft text at the end of its third and final session (17 June 2005). 
The UN General Assembly then adopted the instrument on 8 December 2005, 
rendering it applicable to all UN member states. 
Contentious hurdles
While the GGE unanimously concluded that it was both ‘desirable’ and ‘feasible’ 
to develop an international tracing instrument, it left two important issues un-
resolved: whether the instrument was to be legally or politically binding in char-
acter  (UNGA,  2003a,  paras.  96–98)  and  whether  to  include  ammunition  and   
explosives within the scope of the exercise. As a consequence, the General As-
sembly did not specify whether ammunition or explosives were to be discussed 
when determin  ing the OEWG’s negotiating mandate. Nor did it decide whether A
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the instrument would be legally or politically binding, leaving this matter for the 
negotiations (UNGA, 2003b, para. 5).
Instrument character. The ITI negotiations were almost derailed by the ques-
tion of instrument character. Since there was strong support but no consensus 
on the adoption of a legally binding instrument, UN member states ultimately 
settled for a politically binding instrument. This approach preserved both the 
contents of the text that had been negotiated by the OEWG and the practice of 
reaching UN small arms decisions by consensus. 
Ammunition. Like the GGE before it, the OEWG also had difficulty handling 
the issue of ammunition. Most delegations either supported the inclusion of am-
munition in the scope of the instrument (with the European Union leading the 
charge) or opposed its inclusion (with the United States being the most vocal 
opponent). Many states that opposed the inclusion argued that the large volume 
of ammunition that is traded at the international level would make the imple-
mentation of relevant standards costly and that it would not be feasible to, for 
example, mark each round of small arms ammunition with a unique identifying 
code or serial number (Saferworld, 2011, p. 7). They also argued that, since am-
munition had not been clearly included in the OEWG’s mandate, it could not 
form part of the discussions. The states that supported the inclusion argued that 
the term ‘small arms and light weapons’ implicitly covered ammunition.   
Ultimately, the result of the debate was that ammunition was omitted from the 
scope of the ITI. 
States did agree, however, to include a recommendation in the OEWG report 
‘that the issue of small arms and light weapons ammunition be addressed in a 
comprehensive manner as part of a separate [UN] process’ (UNGA, 2005a, para. 
27). This led to the collection of views among UN member states on the problem 
as well as the establishment of a GGE in 2008 to consider further steps to en-
hance cooperation with regard to the issue of surplus conventional ammu  nitio  n 
stockpiles (UNGA, 2006a, para. 7). The Group recommended the developmen  t 
of appropriate technical guidelines, which would be available for states to use 
on a voluntary basis (UNGA, 2008f, para. 72). This, in turn, led to the develop-
ment of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, which articula  te 
standards for the management of national ammunition stockpiles (see Part 3). 55
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Box 6 ITI timeline
1997  The UN Panel of Experts recommends a study on marking.
2000  A Franco-Swiss initiative promotes the development of new measures 
for marking and tracing.
2001  The PoA is adopted. It includes a recommendation for a UN study on 
the feasibility of developing an international tracing instrument.
July 2002–June 2003  The GGE on tracing meets to consider the feasibility of developing an 
international tracing instrument. The GGE report concludes it is 
desirable and feasible.
December 2003  The UN General Assembly establishes an OEWG to negotiate an 
international tracing instrument.
June 2004–June 2005  The OEWG holds three substantive sessions.
17 June 2005  The OEWG adopts the ITI text.
8 December 2005  The UN General Assembly adopts the ITI.
Purpose
The purpose of the ITI is to enable states to identify and trace, in a timely and reli-
able manner, illicit small arms and light weapons (UNGA, 2005b, para. 1). It also 
seeks to promote and facilitate international cooperation and assistance in mark-
ing and tracing and to complement and enhance the effectiveness of existing 
agreements to address the illicit trade in small arms—notably the PoA (UNGA, 
2005b, para. 2).
Themes
The ITI addresses four main themes to assist with the tracing of illicit small arms 
and light weapons: 
  marking; 
  record-keeping; 
  cooperation in tracing, including subsections on tracing requests and re-
sponses to tracing requests; and 
  implementation, which includes provisions on international cooperation and 
cooperation with the UN and INTERPOL. 
Unlike the PoA, the ITI provides definitions of key terms such as ‘small 
arms’ and ‘light weapons’ (see Box 7).
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Box 7 Definitions in the ITI 
For the purposes of this instrument, ‘small arms and light weapons’ will mean any man-portable 
lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted 
to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique small 
arms and light weapons or their replicas. Antique small arms and light weapons and their replicas 
will be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case will antique small arms and light 
weapons include those manufactured after 1899:
(a)   ‘Small arms’ are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include, inter 
alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and 
light machine guns;  
(b)   ‘Light weapons’ are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two or three persons 
serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person. They include, 
inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, 
portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of 
anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and 
mortars of a calibre of less than 100 millimetres.
For the purposes of this instrument, ‘tracing’ is the systematic tracking of illicit small arms and light 
weapons found or seized on the territory of a State from the point of manufacture or the point of 
importation through the lines of supply to the point at which they became illicit.
Source: reproduced from UNGA (2005b, paras. 4–5)
Main commitments
Table 3 lists the main provisions of the ITI regarding marking, record-keeping, 
tracing, and implementation.
The ITI process
The ITI stipulates that states:
  submit national reports on their ITI implementation every two years (to co-
incide with biennial meetings); 
A state’s report on ITI implementation may form part of its national report 
on PoA implementation.
  meet at biennial meetings convened within the framework of relevant PoA 
meetings, such that the ITI and PoA biennial meetings are held together (un-
less there is no PoA BMS, in which case an ITI BMS is to be held independ-
ently); and
  review the implementation and development of the ITI at review conferences 
within the framework of PoA review conferences (UNGA, 2005b, part VII).
Note57
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Table 3 ITI provisions
Theme ITI paragraphs  Provisions
Marking 7, 8, 10 Ensure that marks are on an exposed surface, conspicuous without tech-
nical aids or tools, easily recognizable, readable, durable, and, as far as 
technically possible, recoverable, and ensure that essential or structural 
components of weapons have unique markings.
8(a) Require either (a) a unique marking that provides the name of the 
manufactur  er, the country of manufacture, and the serial number, or  
(b) an alternative marking using simple geometric symbols in combina-
tio  n with a numeric and/or alphanumeric code, permitting ready identi-
fication of the country of manufacture, and, whenever possible, mark 
additional information such as the year of manufacture, weapon type/
model, and calibre.
8(b) Require, to the extent possible, simple marking on each imported arm, 
permitting identification of the country of import and, where possible, 
the year of import, and also require a unique marking, if the small arm 
or light weapon does not already bear such a marking. 
Unique markings do not need to be applied to arms  
that are temporary imports or permanent imports to be housed in 
museums.
8(c) Ensure that arms transferred from government stockpiles to permanent 
civilian use are marked in a way that permits identification of the coun-
try from whose stockpiles the transfer is made, if it does not already bear 
such a marking.
8(d) Ensure that state-held arms are duly marked.
8(e) Encourage manufacturers to develop measures against the removal or 
alteration of markings.
9 Ensure that all illicit arms that are found or seized are uniquely marked 
and recorded, or destroyed, as soon as possible, and that they are se-
curely stored pending disposal.
Record-keeping 12 Keep records of all weapons marked on national territory indefinitely or 
a stipulated minimum (see below).
12(a) Keep manufacturing records for at least 30 years.
12(b) Keep records of transfers and all other records for at least 20 years.
13 Require companies that are going out of business to forward their 
records   to the state.
Cooperation in 
tracing
14–23 Ensure the implementation of tracing systems capable of undertaking 
traces and responding to tracing requests. 
Exact tracing systems are left to states, but the ITI  
contain  s a list of information required for tracing requests and 
protocols to be used when responding to such requests.
Note
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Note An Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts, held from 9 to 13 May 
2011, brought together experts on marking, record-keeping, and cooperation on 
tracing of small arms to discuss challenges and opportunities relating to the ITI. This 
was the first meeting of its kind in the context of the PoA process.
Evolution of the ITI and its relationship to other instruments
As with the PoA (see Part 2.2), benchmarks for assessing and monitoring ITI 
implementation efforts are evolving. Since it was adopted in 2005, the ITI provi-
sions have been supplemented with the following texts, all of which include 
commitments and recommendations specific to the ITI: 
  the outcome documents of BMS3 and BMS4 (UNGA, 2008a; 2010);
  the chair’s summary of the Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts in 
2011 (UNGA, 2011);
  the outcome document of the Second Review Conference (UNGA, 2012a).18 
The opening paragraph of the ITI’s preamble highlights the PoA’s commitment 
to strengthening cooperation in identifying and tracing illicit small arms and 
light weapons, and the fifth paragraph draws attention to its complementary 
relationship with the Firearms Protocol.
The PoA itself launched the process that led to the ITI’s eventual adoption 
(UNGA, 2001a, part IV.1.c). Like the PoA, the ITI is a politically binding agree-
ment designed to address elements of the illicit trade in small arms and light 
weapons. In contrast to the PoA, however, the ITI focuses on a specific set of   
Implementation 24 Establish the laws, regulations, and administrative procedures required 
to implement the ITI, as needed.
25 Designate one or more national points of contact to act as liaison(s) on 
all matters relating to the ITI.
27–28 Provide international cooperation and technical, financial, and other 
assistance.
33–35 Cooperate with INTERPOL.
18  For example, the outcome document expands on the ITI’s brief mention of its application to con-
flict situations, with UN member states undertaking to cooperate with UN bodies, organs, and 
missions in tracing weapons collected in conflict or post-conflict settings (UNGA, 2012a, annexe 
II, para. (A)(2)(e)).
Theme ITI paragraphs  Provisions59
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contro  l measures, namely marking, record-keeping, and tracing. The PoA and 
Firearms Protocol contain a number of measures relevant to marking, record-keep-
ing, and tracing, but they do not cover these issues with the same level of detail as 
the ITI, especially with respect to tracing cooperation. As noted above, the ITI 
stipulates that follow-up meetings are to be held simultaneously with those of the 
PoA, although an ITI BMS could be held independently of the PoA if, for some 
reason, a PoA BMS is not held. In practice, PoA and ITI meetings have been held 
simultaneously with the exception of the Open-ended Meeting of Governmental 
Experts of May 2011, a PoA meeting that decided to examine ITI implementation 
challenges and opportunities. 
Resources
Bevan, James and Glenn McDonald. 2012. Weapons Tracing and Peace Support Operations: Theory or 
Practice? Issue Brief No. 4. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
McDonald, Glenn. 2006. ‘Connecting the Dots: The International Tracing Instrument.’ In Small Arms 
Survey. Small Arms Survey 2006: Unfinished Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 94–117.
—. 2012. Precedent in the Making: The UN Meeting of Governmental Experts. Issue Brief No. 5. Geneva: 
Small Arms Survey.
Persi Paoli, Giacomo. 2009. Comparative Analysis of Post-Manufacture Marking Instruments and Practices 
for Small Arms and Light Weapons. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.
—. 2010. The Method behind the Mark: A Review of Firearm Marking Technologies. Issue Brief No. 1. 
Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
Quick reference
The text of the ITI is available here:
 <http://www.poa-iss.org/InternationalTracing/ITI_English.pdf>
Background documents are available here: 
 <http://www.poa-iss.org/InternationalTracing/InternationalTracing.aspx> 
2.4 The Geneva Declaration
Background
The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development is a diplomatic 
initiative aimed at addressing the interrelations between armed violence and A
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development. It supports states and civil society actors in achieving measurable 
reductions in armed violence in conflict and non-conflict settings by 2015.
The Geneva Declaration was initially adopted by 42 states, on 7 June 2006 
during a ministerial summit in Geneva. To date, it is the strongest political state-
ment that addresses the impact of armed violence within a development context. 
The summit reflected a common will among representatives of the donor com-
munity and countries directly affected by armed violence to reduce political and 
criminal armed violence in order to enhance sustainable development at the 
global, regional, and national levels.
Under the Declaration, signatories have agreed to strengthen their efforts to 
integrate armed violence reduction and conflict prevention programmes into na-
tional, regional, and multilateral development frameworks and strategies. They 
have pledged to work on practical and other measures that promote conflict pre-
vention and stem the proliferation, illegal trafficking, and misuse of small arms 
and light weapons by fully implementing existing instruments, including the 
PoA (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, n.d.a).
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development defines armed 
violence as: 
the use or threatened use of weapons to inflict injury, death or psycho-
social harm (OECD, 2011, p. ii). 
This working definition covers armed violence perpetrated in both conflict and 
non-conflict settings. 
Policy-makers have become increasingly aware that armed violence undermines 
development  and  aid  effectiveness  and  hinders  the  achievement  of  the  UN   
Millennium Development Goals. In the outcome document of the Millennium +5 
World Summit of 2005, heads of state acknowledge that development, peace, 
security, and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. In a   
2009 report, the UN Secretary-General recognizes that armed violence under-
mines development and constitutes an impediment to the achievement of   
the Millennium Development Goals (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, n.d.d; 
UNGA, 2009b).
What is armed violence?61
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Purpose
More than 100 countries have adopted the Geneva Declaration. A Core Group of 
14 signatory states and affiliated organizations is responsible for steering the 
process and guiding the implementation of the Geneva Declaration. Regular 
high-level diplomatic regional meetings and ministerial review conferences take 
place to assess progress concerning the process and implementation of the 
Geneva Declaration. The first two ministerial review conferences took place in 
2008 and 2011 and the next one has been scheduled for the second half of 2014 
(Geneva Declaration Secretariat, n.d.b). 
The implementation framework of the Geneva Declaration calls for action 
focused on three pillars, as shown in Table 4.
Table 4 The three pillars of the Geneva Declaration
Advocacy Measurability Programming
Raising global awareness 
about the negative impact 
of armed violence on 
develop  ment and the 
achievability of the Millen  - 
nium Development Goals.
Measuring and monitoring 
armed violence to improve 
understanding of its impact 
on development, including 
through national assessment  s 
at the country level and use 
of the Global Burden of 
Armed Violence as a tool for 
global monitoring.
Programming informed by 
the collection and sharing 
of knowledge and experi- 
ences of effective armed 
violence reduction 
interventions.
Source: Geneva Declaration Secretariat (n.d.b)
The Geneva Declaration Secretariat has produced two editions of the 
Global Burden of Armed Violence, released in 2008 and 2011, with a third due to be 
released in the second half of 2014. These volumes provide information and data on 
the wide-ranging costs and impact of armed conflict and crime on development and 
offer researchers and policy-makers new tools for studying and tackling different forms 
of violence. The 2011 edition, for instance, draws on comprehensive country-level 
data on conflict-related and criminal violence to estimate that at least 526,000 people 
die violently every year, more than three-quarters of them in non-conflict settings. It 
also highlights that one-quarter of all violent deaths occur in just 14 countries, seven 
of which are in the Americas (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, n.d.c). 
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Main commitments
In order to achieve measurable reductions in armed violence and tangible im-
provements in development by 2015, states have agreed to: 
  monitor and measure the scope, scale, and distribution of armed violence;
  integrate armed violence prevention and reduction objectives and activities 
into development and security plans and programmes;
  advance development strategies and institutional capacities that target the 
key risk factors that give rise to armed violence;
  implement existing agreements to address the supply of, demand for, and 
illicit trafficking in small arms, light weapons, and ammunition;
  recognize and ensure the rights of victims of armed violence;
  increase the effectiveness of financial, technical, and human resources and 
assistance;
  support collaborative mechanisms, partnerships, and initiatives;
  nominate a national point of contact on the Geneva Declaration; and
  strengthen efforts to share knowledge, experiences, and good practice with 
respect to armed violence reduction programming (Geneva Declaration   
Secretariat, 2011).
Relationship to other instruments
The focus of the PoA is on the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, while 
the Firearms Protocol approaches the issue from a crime and law enforcement 
perspective. In contrast, the Geneva Declaration was borne of a desire to redirect 
the focus of the small arms process away from supply issues and towards factors 
linked to the demand for weapons, the causes of armed violence, and develop-
ment and security concerns. 
Resources
Geneva Declaration Secretariat. 2008. Global Burden of Armed Violence. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
—. 2011. 2nd Ministerial Review Conference on the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development: 
Outcome Document. <www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/GD-MRC2/GD-2ndMRC- 
Outcome-Document.pdf>63
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y —. n.d.a. ‘What is the Declaration?’ <www.genevadeclaration.org/the-geneva-declaration/what-is-the- 
declaration.html>
—. n.d.b ‘How Does It Work?’ <www.genevadeclaration.org/the-geneva-declaration/how-does-it-
work.html>
—. n.d.c. ‘Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011.’ <www.genevadeclaration.org/measurability/
global-burden-of-armed-violence/global-burden-of-armed-violence-2011.html>
United Nations General Assembly. 2009b. Promoting Development through the Reduction and Prevention 
of Armed Violence: Report of the Secretary-General. A/64/228 of 5 August 2009.
Quick reference
The text of the Geneva Declaration is available here: 
  <http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/GD-Declaration-091020-EN.pdf>
The Geneva Declaration Secretariat maintains a list of states that have signed the Geneva Declaration: 
<http://www.genevadeclaration.org/the-geneva-declaration/who-has-signed-it.html>
2.5 The Arms Trade Treaty
Background
The Arms Trade Treaty is a multilateral instrument that regulates the inter-
national transfer of conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons. 
The ATT was adopted on 2 April 2013 by General Assembly Resolution 67/234 
B (UNGA, 2013a, para. 1). 
The ATT will enter into force 90 days after the 50th state deposits an 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval with the Secretary-General (UNGA, 
2013b, art. 22(1)). Once it enters into force, the ATT will be legally binding on those 
states that have ratified or otherwise formally expressed their consent to be bound by it.
History
The campaign for an international arms trade treaty can be traced back to the 
mid-1990s, when a group of Nobel Peace Prize laureates voiced concern over the 
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destructive effects of the unregulated arms trade and called for an international 
agreement to prevent irresponsible arms transfers (Nobel Peace Prize Laureates, 
1997; see Box 8). 
In 2003, the cause was joined by Control Arms, a non-governmental coalition 
that comprised Amnesty International, IANSA, and Oxfam, which led the civil 
society campaign calling for a global, legally binding agreement to ease the suf-
fering caused by irresponsible transfers of conventional weapons and ammuni-
tion. Support for the initiative began to grow at the UN as states such as the 
United Kingdom spearheaded discussions on a possible treaty.
The General Assembly adopted the first ATT resolution in December 2006, 
calling for states’ views on the feasibility, scope, and draft parameters for a   
legall  y binding instrument establishing common international standards on 
arms transfers (UNGA, 2006b). The Secretary-General compiled these views in a 
report that informed a GGE19 that was to examine the feasibility of such a treaty 
and produce a report (UNGA, 2006b, para. 2; 2007b–f; 2008d).
With the second ATT resolution, passed in December 2008, the General As-
sembly established an open-ended working group to meet for up to six sessions 
to further consider elements raised in the GGE report for inclusion in an even-
tual treaty (UNGA, 2008b). One year later, the third ATT resolution endorsed the 
OEWG’s report, set aside four consecutive weeks to convene a United Nations 
conference on the ATT in 2012, and converted the remaining sessions of the 
OEWG into PrepComs for the 2012 conference (UNGA, 2009a). 
When this conference failed to adopt an ATT by consensus, a further final 
conference was scheduled and held in March 2013 (UNGA, 2012b, para. 2). This 
final conference also failed to achieve consensus on a text as a result of blocking 
by Iran, North Korea, and Syria. However, the final draft text that was presented 
to UN member states for adoption during the conference was put to the General 
Assembly for adoption by a vote a few days after the end of the March confer-
ence. On 2 April 2013, the ATT was adopted by an overwhelming majority vote 
in the General Assembly and was opened for signature on 3 June 2013 (UNGA, 
2013b, paras. 1, 3). 
19  The GGE comprised 28 experts from Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States.65
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Box 8 ATT timeline
May 1997  Nobel Peace Prize Laureates, led by Oscar Arias and supported by 
NGOs, write the International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers, 
the seed of the ATT movement.
2003   Control Arms joins the cause for a global, legally binding agreement.
6 December 2006  In its first ATT resolution (A/RES/61/89), entitled ‘Towards an Arms 
Trade Treaty: Establishing Common International Standards for the 
Import, Export and Transfer of Conventional Arms’, the UN General 
Assembly calls for states’ views on the feasibility, scope, and draft 
parameters for a legally binding instrument and establishes a GGE 
to examine the same for a treaty.
17 August 2007  The UN Secretary-General issues Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: 
Establishing Common International Standards for the Import, Export 
and Transfer of Conventional Arms (A/62/278), a compilation of the 
views of 9420 states in response to Resolution 61/89.
11–15 February, 12–16 May,   The GGE convenes over three sessions to examine the feasibility,
28 July–8 August 2008   scope, and draft parameters of the treaty.
26 August 2008   The GGE issues its report examining the feasibility, scope, and draft 
parameters for a treaty (UNGA, 2008c).
24 December 2008   In its second ATT resolution (A/RES/63/240), the UN General 
Assembly establishes an OEWG to further consider the recom-
mendations of the Secretary-General’s report. 
2–6 March 2009   The OEWG convenes its first substantive session.
July 2009   The OEWG convenes its second substantive session on 13–17 July 
and submits its report on the 20th (UNGA, 2009c).
2 December 2009   In its third ATT resolution (A/RES/64/48), the UN General Assembly 
endorses the OEWG report and decides to convene a UN 
Conference on the ATT for four weeks in 2012 (UNGA, 2009a).  
The remainin  g scheduled OEWG sessions are changed to  
PrepCom meetings.
12–23 July 2010   The first ATT PrepCom begins discussions on the possible structure, 
contents, principles, parameters, implementation, application, and 
scope of an arms trade treaty.
28 February–3 March 2011  The second ATT PrepCom meets.
11–15 July 2011  The third ATT PrepCom meets.
13–17 February 2012   The fourth ATT PrepCom meets.
2–27 July 2012   The UN Conference on the ATT convenes in New York but fails to 
reach consensus on the draft treaty.
24 December 2012  In its fourth ATT resolution (A/RES/67/234), the UN General 
Assembly agrees to convene the Final United Nations Conference 
on the ATT using the draft text A/CONF.271/CRP.1 as a basis for 
future negotiations (UNGA, 2012b).
20  A further six states submitted their views after the publication of the Secretary-General’s report.A
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18–28 March 2013   The Final United Nations Conference on the ATT convenes in New 
York but fails to reach consensus on the draft text A/CONF.271/
CRP.1; the text is presented to the General Assembly as an annexe 
to Resolution A/67/L.58.
2 April 2013   The General Assembly adopts the ATT with 154 votes in favour,  
3 votes against, and 23 abstentions.
3 June 2013  The ATT opens for signature.
While the official UN voting record indicates that on 2 April 2013, 154 
UN member states voted in favour of the resolution, with 3 votes against and 23 
abstentions, the final vote was in fact 156 in favour, 3 against, and 22 abstentions. 
Angola changed its vote from an abstention to ‘yes’ and Cape Verde, which was not 
present at the vote on 2 April, subsequently registered a ‘yes’ vote.
Purpose 
The ATT establishes legally binding commitments governing the international 
trade—comprising the export, import, transit, transhipment, and brokering—of 
conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons. Article 1 sets out 
the ‘object and purpose’ of the ATT: 
The object of the Treaty is to:
  Establish the highest possible common international standards for regulating 
or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms; 
  Prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their 
diversion; 
for the purpose of:
  Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability; 
  Reducing human suffering; 
  Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States Parties 
in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building confidence 
among States Parties (UNGA, 2013b, art. 1).
Note67
Note
Themes
Central to the ATT is the need to control the international transfer of arms, par-
ticularly the export of arms, to avoid misuse and diversion. 
Scope
Conventional arms. The ATT provisions apply to the following categories of 
conventional arms:
1.  battle tanks;
2.  armoured combat vehicles;
3.  large-calibre artillery systems;
4.  combat aircraft; 
5.  attack helicopters;
6.  warships;
7.  missiles and missile launchers; and
8.  small arms and light weapons (UNGA, 2013b, art. 2(1)).
The categories of arms covered by the ATT include the seven categories of 
the UN Register of Conventional Arms (see Part 3) as well as small arms and light 
weapons, which do not form an official category of the UN Register although states 
are invited to report on them. For this reason, the list of conventional arms included in 
the ATT is often referred to as the ‘7 plus 1’ formula, referring to the seven categories 
of the UN Register plus small arms and light weapons. 
Some of the ATT provisions also apply to ammunition/munitions and parts 
and components (UNGA, 2013b, arts. 3, 4; see Table 5). 
Not all of the ATT provisions apply to ammunition/munitions and parts 
and components.
Transactions and activities. The ATT includes provisions governing the ‘inter-
national trade’, referred to as ‘transfer’ of arms and defined to consist of the fol-
lowing activities: export, import, transit, transhipment, and brokering (UNGA, 
2013b, art. 2(2)). 
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During the ATT negotiations, some states wanted to include a reference to 
‘leases’, ‘gifts’, and ‘loans’ to cover transactions that do not involve financial 
consideration or payment under the definition of ‘transfer’. Ultimately, an 
explicit reference to these types of transactions was not included and, accord-
ingly, it is not settled whether the application of ‘import’ and ‘export’ is restric-
ted to sales or leases (an exchange of arms in return for money) or also covers 
gifts and free loans (Casey-Maslen, Giacca, and Vestner, 2013, p. 20).
Main commitments
Table 5 lists the main provisions of the ATT regarding the control of inter  national 
transfers and implementation.
What is not included in the ATT definition of ‘transfer’? 
Table 5 ATT provisions
Theme ATT articles  Provisions
Ammunition/ 
munitions
3 Establish and maintain national control systems to regulate export of 
conventional ammunition/munitions.
Parts and  
components
4 Establish and maintain national control systems to regulate export of 
parts and components that provide the capability to assemble conven-
tional weapons covered under the treaty.
General  
implementation
5(2) Establish a national control system in order to implement the treaty.
5(2), 5(4) Establish a national control list and provide it to the ATT Secretariat.
5(5) Designate competent national authorities in order to have an effective 
and transparent national control system.
5(6) Designate one or more national points of contact and notify the ATT 
Secretariat.
Prohibitions 6(1) Refrain from authorizing transfers of conventional arms, ammunition, or 
parts and components that would violate UN Security Council and UN 
Charter obligations, in particular arms embargoes.
6(2) Refrain from authorizing transfers of conventional arms, ammunition, or 
parts and components that would violate obligations under international 
agreements to which the state in question is a party.
6(3) Refrain from authorizing any transfer of conventional arms, ammunition, 
or parts and components that would be used in the commission of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions, attacks directed against civilians, or other war crimes.
Export and export 
assessment
7(1) Prior to authorization of export of conventional arms, ammunition, or 
parts and components, assess the potential that the items: would con-
tribut  e to or undermine peace and security, or that they could be used  
to breach international humanitarian and human rights law or inter-
national conventions or protocols relating to terrorism or transnational 
organized crime.69
7(2) Consider whether there are measures that could be taken to mitigate 
risks identified in 7(1).
7(3) Refrain from authorizing the export of conventional arms, ammunition, 
or parts and components if the assessment determines that there is an 
overriding risk of any negative consequences in 7(1).
7(4) Take into account the risk of the conventional arms, ammunition, or 
parts and components being used to commit or facilitate serious acts  
of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women  
and children.
7(5) Ensure all authorizations for export are detailed and issued prior to export.
7(6) Make available all information about the authorization, upon request, to 
the importing, transit, and transhipment states parties.
7(7) Consider reassessing the authorization if new relevant information be-
comes available after authorization.
Import 8(1) If importing, ensure that relevant information is provided, upon request, 
pursuant to national law, to assist the exporting state party, such as 
end-use or end-user documentation.
8(2) If importing conventional arms, take measures to regulate, where neces-
sary, imports under state jurisdiction, such as import systems.
8(3) If importing, may request information from the exporting state concern-
ing export authorizations.
Transit or  
transhipment
9 Take appropriate measures to regulate, where necessary and feasible, 
the transit or transhipment of conventional arms through its territory.
Brokering 10 Take measures, pursuant to national laws, to regulate brokering for 
conventional arms taking place within state jurisdiction, such as registra-
tion or brokering authorizations.
Diversion 11(1) Take measures to prevent diversion of conventional arms.
11(2) If exporting, seek to prevent diversion of conventional arms through a 
national control system (Article 5(2)) by assessing the risk of diversion.
11(3) Cooperate and exchange information, pursuant to national laws, where 
appropriate and feasible, in order to mitigate the risk of diversion of 
conventional arms.
11(4) If diversion of conventional arms is detected, take appropriate measures, 
pursuant to national laws and in accordance with international law, to 
address the diversion, such as by alerting potentially affected states parties, 
examining diverted shipments, and working with law enforcement officials.
11(5), 11(6) Consider sharing relevant information on effective measures to  
address diversion of conventional arms, such as reporting through  
the ATT Secretariat.
Record-keeping 12(1), 12(4) Maintain records, pursuant to national laws and regulations, of export 
authorizations or actual exports pertaining to conventional arms. Keep 
records for a minimum of ten years.
12(2), 12(4) Consider maintaining records of imports, transit, and transhipment of 
conventional arms. Keep records for a minimum of ten years.
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Reporting 13(1) Within the first year of entry into force of the treaty for the state, report 
to the ATT Secretariat on measures undertaken to implement the treaty.
13(2) Consider reporting to other states parties, through the ATT Secretariat, 
on effective measures taken to address diversion of conventional arms.
13(3) Submit annual reports to the ATT Secretariat concerning authorized or 
actual exports and imports of conventional arms.
Enforcement 14 Take appropriate measures to enforce national laws and regulations that 
implement the provisions of the treaty.
International  
cooperation
15(1) Cooperate with states parties to implement the treaty effectively.
15(2), 15(3), 
15(4)
Consider facilitating international cooperation, consultation, and assist-
ance, including information exchange, on matters of mutual interest 
regarding implementation.
15(5) If jointly agreed, assist other states in investigations, prosecutions, and 
judicial proceedings regarding violations of national measures estab-
lished pursuant to the treaty.
15(6) Consider cooperating to prevent the transfer of conventional arms from 
becoming subject to corrupt practices.
15(7) Consider exchanging information on lessons learnt in relation to the 
treaty.
International  
assistance
16(1), 16(2) Consider requesting, offering, or receiving assistance for implementing 
the treaty. Assistance may include: legal or legislative assistance, stock-
pile management, DDR programmes, model legislation, and effective 
practices. Assistance may be provided through states, the UN, or inter-
national, regional, sub-regional, or national organizations.
16(3) Together with other states parties, establish a voluntary trust to assist 
those requiring assistance to implement the treaty. Consider contributing 
resources to the fund.
The ATT process
The ATT stipulates that:
  the treaty opened for signature on 3 June 2013 (UNGA, 2013b, art. 21(1));
  a Conference of States Parties shall be convened within one year following 
entry into force of the treaty (and thereafter as decided by the Conference) 
(art. 17(1));
  an ATT Secretariat shall be established to assist states parties in effective im-
plementation (art. 18(1));
  states parties shall submit an initial report to the ATT Secretariat within the 
Theme ATT articles Provisions71
first year after entry into force for that state, providing details of measures 
undertaken to implement the treaty (art. 13(1)); 
  states parties are encouraged to report on and submit information on meas-
ures taken that have proved effective in addressing diversion (arts. 11(6), 
13(2)); and
  states parties shall submit annual reports (by 31 May) on authorized or actual 
exports and imports of conventional arms. Such reports may contain the 
same information submitted to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (see 
Part 3) and may exclude commercially sensitive or national security inform-
ation (art. 13(3)). 
States parties are encouraged, but not required, to submit annual reports 
on exports or imports of ammunition or parts and components.
Relationship to other instruments
The ATT makes a significant contribution to the existing framework governing 
international transfers of small arms. By establishing detailed arms export licens-
ing criteria, for example, the ATT complements and enhances the relevant com-
mitments under the PoA, which is less prescriptive than the ATT in this regard 
(UNGA, 2001a, para. II.11). It also surpasses the Firearms Protocol, which does not 
mention a requirement to apply licensing criteria, although it does require states 
parties to establish an export licensing system (UNGA, 2001c, art. 10(1)). Further-
more, in contrast to the PoA, the ATT establishes legally binding commitments in 
this regard and expressly covers ammunition and parts and components.
With respect to regulating the import, transit, and brokering of small arms, 
however, the ATT’s provisions are arguably weaker. While the PoA and the Fire-
arms Protocol (which covers ammunition and parts and components) require 
states to establish a system of import licensing or authorization, the ATT con-
tains a qualified obligation for states parties to ‘take measures to regulate’ im-
ports ‘where necessary’ (UNGA, 2013b, art. 8(2)). Similarly, with respect to 
transit, while the PoA and the Firearms Protocol require states to establish meas-
ures on transit (UNGA, 2001a, paras. 2, 11, 12; 2001c, art. 10(1)), the ATT includes 
a qualified commitment whereby states parties will take ‘appropriate’ measures 
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to regulate the transit and transhipment of arms ‘where necessary and feasible’ 
(UNGA, 2013b, art. 9). In addition, the ATT provisions with respect to import 
and transit do not apply to transfers of ammunition or parts and components, 
while those in the Firearms Protocol do.
Finally, the ATT requires states parties to keep records for ‘a minimum of ten 
years’ (UNGA, 2013b, art. 12(4)). Meanwhile, the ITI stipulates that states should 
keep records indefinitely but—in the case of transfers—at least 20 years (UNGA, 
2005b, para. 12). 
In summary, while the ATT enhances some existing national commitments 
and clarifies certain ambiguities in the existing control system, it also introduces 
inconsistencies.21 
Resources
Casey-Maslen, Stuart, Gilles Giacca, and Tobias Vestner. 2013. The Arms Trade Treaty. Academy Briefing 
No. 3. Geneva: Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. June. 
<http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/Arms%20Trade%20Treaty%203%20
WEB(2).pdf>
Parker, Sarah. 2013a. ‘Breaking New Ground? The Arms Trade Treaty.’ In Small Arms Survey. Small 
Arms Survey 2014: Women and Guns. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 77–107.
Quick reference
The full text of the treaty, including amendments and corrections to translations, as well as an up-
dated list of states that have signed, ratified, accepted, approved, and acceded to the ATT is 
available at: 
 <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-8&chapter 
=26&lang=en>
UNODA provides information on the ATT negotiations and process: 
 <http://www.un.org/disarmament/ATT/>
The list of states that voted for, voted against, and abstained from voting on the General Assembly 
resolution to adopt an ATT is available at: 
 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/ga11354.doc.htm>
21  For a detailed comparative overview, see Parker (2013b).PART 3
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Security Council engagement 
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council can take enforcement 
measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. The use of 
sanctions is intended to apply pressure on a state or entity to comply with the 
objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to the use of force. In 
addition to financial and diplomatic restrictions, the range of sanctions has in-
cluded comprehensive economic and trade sanctions as well as more targeted 
measures, such as arms embargoes and travel bans.
Arms embargoes aim to halt the flow of weapons and the provision of train-
ing and related services to targeted governments or factions. They are often 
accompan  ied by transport-related sanctions, including air and naval blockades, 
designed to reduce the cross-border movement of weapons. Arms embargoes, 
while sometimes stand-alone measures, often form part of a broader sanctions 
regime that places restrictions on trade, the movement of funds, travel, and dip-
lomatic representation.
Since small arms are often the weapons of primary concern in embargoed 
zones, the link between UN arms embargoes and the UN small arms process is 
strong. Indeed, the PoA calls on states to ensure the effective implementation of 
UN arms embargoes (UNGA, 2001a, para. 32).
In addition, the Security Council holds regular meetings relating to small 
arms. The most recent was held on 26 September 2013 (UNSC, 2013b). 
General Assembly resolutions
General Assembly resolutions are formal expressions of the opinion or will of 
UN member states. They have been used throughout the international small 
arms and disarmament processes to initiate key conferences and meetings (see 
Part 2). 
Every year during the First Committee—the Disarmament and International 
Security Committee, which deals with disarmament and related international 
security questions—the General Assembly adopts a resolution titled ‘The Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects’. This resolution is 
referred to as the ‘omnibus’ resolution. 75
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The Secretary-General’s reports
In June 2007, the president of the Security Council requested that the UN 
Secretar  y-General submit a biennial report to the Security Council on small 
arms, including analysis, observations, and recommendations on the imple-
mentation of the PoA (UNSC, 2007). So far, reports were submitted in April 2008, 
April 2011, and August 2013.22
The 2008 report indicates that the issue of small arms cannot be tackled with 
arms control measures alone—and that it must be addressed as part of a broader 
effort to arrive at security, crime, human rights, health, and development policy 
solutions (UNSC, 2008).
In his 2011 report, the Secretary-General reviews trade and brokering, mark-
ing, record-keeping, and tracing of weapons, stockpile management, armed vi-
olence, and the use and misuse of small arms, with special attention paid to the 
trade, storage, and tracing of ammunition (UNSC, 2011). 
In his 2013 report, the Secretary-General considers current and emerging 
concerns regarding the impact of illicit small arms on peace and security around 
the world, particularly with respect to Africa, the protection of civilians in armed 
conflict, and sexual violence in conflict. The report also provides information on 
measures taken to address the challenge of illicit small arms, including an assess-
men  t of efforts to address this issue through UN peacekeeping, political, and 
peacebuilding missions (UNSC, 2013a).
The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
Established in 1978, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters advises the 
Secretary-General on disarmament issues, including research conducted under 
the auspices of the UN. The Board meets twice per year, alternating between 
New York and Geneva, and adopts its agenda based on its own recommenda-
tions and requests from the Secretary-General for advice on specific disarma-
ment issues. The Board also serves as the Board of Trustees of the UN Institute 
for Disarmament Research, whose work it reviews (UNODA, n.d.a).
22  While previous reports on small arms were prepared by the Secretary-General, they were not 
necessarily specific to the PoA. A list of previous reports is available at UN (n.d.e).A
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The UN Register of Conventional Arms
The UN Register was established in 1991 to increase transparency in arms trans-
fers and to monitor excessive or destabilizing accumulations of arms. Member 
states are asked to submit annual reports on their imports and exports of con-
ventional arms based on an agreed template. Since its inception, the Register has 
received reports from more than 170 states.
The Register covers seven categories of conventional weapons: 
  battle tanks; 
  armoured combat vehicles; 
  large-calibre artillery systems; 
  combat aircraft; 
  attack helicopters; 
  warships; and 
  missiles and missile launchers. 
States have agreed to work on expanding the Register’s scope through a ded-
icated GGE, which convenes every three years and reports to the General As-
sembly, which may then implement the GGE’s recommendations in a resolution.
The first revision of the Register’s scope occurred in 2003, when the large- 
calibr  e artillery and missile and launcher categories were broadened to encom-
pass the common 81 mm and 82 mm mortars and MANPADS. Officially, small 
arms remain outside the Register’s scope, but a system of voluntary information 
sharing on all military small arms and light weapons (termed ‘additional back-
ground information’) has been included in UN Register reporting since 2004. 
According to the UN, most states now include small arms categories in their 
annual reporting (UN, n.d.b).
 In discussions on the scope of an ATT, participants may hear references 
to the formula ‘7 plus 1’. This term relates to the seven categories of the UN Register 
plus small arms and light weapons, which do not form an official category although 
states are invited to report on them. The formula ‘7 plus 1 plus 1’ refers to the seven 
categories of the UN Register plus small arms and light weapons and ammunition. 
Note77
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The Conference on Disarmament
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was established in 1979 as the forum for 
multilateral negotiations on disarmament. It has gradually expanded from 40 to 65 
members. Other UN member states are able to take part in its work as observers.
The CD meets annually for 24 weeks, divided into three sessions of 10, 7, and 
7 weeks. The CD is presided by its members on a rotating basis and six presid-
ents are appointed every year for a period of four weeks each. Meetings are held 
at the Palais des Nations in Geneva and the CD conducts its work by consensus. 
The CD adopts its own rules of procedure and its own agenda; it reports to the 
General Assembly annually, or more frequently, as appropriate. 
The CD has negotiated multilateral disarmament agreements such as the Bio-
logical23 and Chemical24 Weapons Conventions and the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).25 Since the conclusion CTBT negotiations in August 
1996, however, the CD has remained deadlocked. It has not been able to reach 
consensus on a work programme and thus to commence substantive delibera-
tions, except in 1998 and 2009.
The Disarmament Commission
The Disarmament Commission was created in 1952 as a mechanism under the 
Security Council. In 1978, it was revamped as a subsidiary organ of the General 
Assembly, composed of all UN member states. The Commission is a deliberative 
body that considers and makes recommendations on various disarmament   
23  The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteri-
ological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, commonly known as the Biolo-
gical Weapons Convention (BWC) or Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), opened 
for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975.
24  The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) is 
usually referred to as the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. It is also known as the 
Inhumane Weapons Convention. The original Convention with three annexed protocols was ad-
opted on 10 October 1980, opened for signature for one year from 10 April 1981, and entered into 
force on 2 December 1983. Subsequent protocols and amendments have been adopted.
25  The CTBT was negotiated in the CD between 1994 and 1996. Consensus could not be achieved and 
so the treaty was introduced directly to the UN General Assembly, where it was adopted on 10 
September 1996. It opened for signature on 24 September 1996 but has not yet entered into force.A
 
D
i
p
l
o
m
a
t
’
s
 
G
u
i
d
e
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
U
N
 
S
m
a
l
l
 
A
r
m
s
 
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
H
a
n
d
b
o
o
k
78
issue  s; it reports annually to the General Assembly, which has endorsed a num-
ber of its consensus principles, guidelines, and recommendations.
International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
In 2008, a GGE reported to the General Assembly on problems arising from the 
accumulation  of  surplus  ammunition  stockpiles.  It  highlighted  that  effective 
stockpile management required a broad approach, including categorizing and 
accounting systems, safe handling and storage practices, and physical security, 
surveillance, and testing procedures.
Central to the GGE’s recommendations was the development of UN technical 
guidelines for the management of ammunition stockpiles, now known as Inter-
national Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG). The IATG were developed 
by a panel of governmental experts with the support of international, govern-
mental, and non-governmental organizations. 
The IATG were designed as a frame of reference to assist states in establishing 
national standards and standing operating procedures. By providing guidance 
on improving safety, security, and efficiency in ammunition stockpile manage-
ment, they explain how conventional stockpile management requirements may 
be met (UN, n.d.c).
The IATG are shaped by four guiding principles:
  the right of governments to apply national standards to national stockpiles;
  the need to protect those most at risk (such as local civilians and explosives 
workers) from undesirable explosive events;
  the requirement to build a national capacity to develop, maintain, and apply 
appropriate standards for stockpile management; and
  the need to maintain consistency and compliance with other international 
norms, conventions, and agreements (UNODA, 2011, p. 3).
The IATG are regularly reviewed and adapted to reflect developments in am-
munition stockpile management norms and to incorporate amendments to ap-
propriate international regulations (UN, n.d.c).79
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International Small Arms Control Standards
In collaboration with partners worldwide, the United Nations has elaborated 
International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) to streamline policy- 
makin  g, programming, and practice on small arms and light weapons control 
across the more than 20 UN entities that make up the Coordinating Action on 
Small Arms, or CASA, mechanism.
ISACS are designed to assist UN entities working on small arms issues to de-
liver, upon request, consistent advice and support to UN member states on put-
ting in place and maintaining effective controls over small arms and light weapons.
The standards were developed within the framework of existing global 
agreements on small arms and light weapons control (see Part 2). They build on 
practices elaborated at the regional and sub-regional levels.
Resources
Quick reference
Security Council engagement
A list of UN—and other—past and current arms embargoes is available from the Arms Embargoes 
Database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at: 
 <www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes> 
A full listing of Security Council small arms-related meetings is available at:
 <www.poa-iss.org/poa/sc.aspx>
General Assembly resolutions
General Assembly resolutions are available at: 
 <http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm>
The Secretary-General’s reports
The PoA–ISS site hosts the following reports on small arms by the Secretary-General: 
  2008: <http://www.poa-iss.org/DocsUpcomingEvents/S-2008-258.pdf>
  2011: <http://www.poa-iss.org/Poa/S-2011-255-smallarms-en.pdf>
  2013: <http://www.poa-iss.org/Poa/S-2013-503-E.pdf>
The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
Information on the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters is available at: 
 <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/AdvisoryBoard/AdvisoryBoard.shtml>
The UN Register of Conventional Arms
Background information on the UN Register is available at:
   <http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Register/>A
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Data and records pertaining to the UN Register are available at: 
 <http://www.un-register.org/HeavyWeapons/Index.aspx>
The Conference on Disarmament
Information on the Conference on Disarmament, including its history and upcoming meetings, is 
available at: 
  <http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/2D415EE455FAE07C12571800055232B?
OpenDocument>
The Disarmament Commission
Information on the Disarmament Commission is available at: 
 <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/DisarmamentCommission/UNDiscom.shtml>
International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
Information on the IATG is available at: 
 <www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Ammunition/IATG/>
International Small Arms Control Standards
ISACS are available at:
 <www.smallarmsstandards.org>
UN disarmament-related activities
UNODA hosts information on all matters related to disarmament at:
 <http://www.un.org/disarmament/>PART 4
Multilateral and Regional Instruments, 
Tools, and OrganizationsA
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In the mid-1990s, multilateral and regional organizations began to examine do-
mestic small arms policies and placed the issue of small arms proliferation and 
misuse on national and regional agendas. A number of regional initiatives, or-
ganizations, and instruments subsequently emerged and paved the way for the 
2001 UN small arms conference; others have since complemented the PoA, Fire-
arms Protocol, and ITI.
The Wassenaar Arrangement
The Wassenaar Arrangement was established in the wake of the cold war to re-
place the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, or COCOM. 
At a high-level meeting in Wassenaar, the Netherlands, in December 1995, the 
Arrangement was established to promote greater transparency and responsibil-
ity in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. 
Through their national policies, the 41 participating states seek to ensure that 
transfers of arms do not contribute to destabilizing accumulations. The decision 
whether to deny a transfer lies solely with each participating state and is taken 
in accordance with national legislation; however, the states have agreed on a set 
of criteria to be applied when deciding whether to export weapons, including 
the Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (WA,   
1998; 2002).
Wassenaar Arrangement signatories have agreed to report on all transfers 
and denials of listed items. These items include 22 that are designed for military 
use, such as: 
  small arms and light weapons and related ammunition;
  tanks and other military armed vehicles; 
  combat vessels (surface or underwater); and
  armoured and protective equipment.
The Arrangement also includes nine categories and two annexes of dual-use 
goods and technologies. Exchanged information is confidential and intended as 
an intergovernmental transparency device among participating states (WA, n.d.a).
26  A list of the participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement is available at WA (n.d.a).83
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27  For a comprehensive list of all relevant regional instruments and organizations, see Berman and 
Maze (2012).
Regional instruments and organizations 
Table 6 provides an overview of some of the main regional organizations and 
instruments relevant to small arms control. Instruments that are legally binding 
are highlighted in red.27 
Table 6 Selected regional instruments and organizations addressing small arms control
Region Scope Regional organization Year Instrument
Americas Regional Organization of 
American States
1997 Inter-American Convention against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related 
Materials (CIFTA) (in force since 1998)
1999 Inter-American Convention on Transparency in 
Conventional Weapons Acquisitions (in force 
since 2002)
2003 Model Regulations for the Control of the 
International Movement of Firearms, Their Parts 
and Components and Ammunition (updated)
2003 Amendments to the Model Regulations for the 
Control of the International Movement of 
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and 
Ammunition—Broker Regulations
2005 Guidelines on Controls and Security of 
MANPADS
2007 Model Legislation on the Marking and Tracing of 
Firearms
2008 Proposed Model Legislation and Commentaries 
for Strengthening Controls at Export Points for 
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other 
Related Materials
2008 Draft Model Legislation and Commentaries on 
Legislative Measures to Establish Criminal 
Offenses in Relation to the Illicit Manufacturing 
of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, 
Explosives and Other Related Materials 
Sub-
regional
Andean Community 
of Nations
2002 Andean Chart for Peace and Security and 
Limitation and Control of the Expenditure on 
Foreign Defense (Lima Commitment)
2003 Andean Community Decision 552: Andean Plan 
to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade 
in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its 
Aspects (adopted 2003)
Caribbean 
Community and 
Common Market 
(CARICOM)
2011 Declaration on Small Arms and Light WeaponsA
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Americas
(continued)
Sub-
regional
Central American 
Integration System 
(SICA)
2005 Code of Conduct of Central American States on 
the Transfer of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and 
Other Related Materiel (SICA Code of Conduct)
Inter-American Drug 
Abuse Control 
Commission (CICAD)
1998 Model Regulations
Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR)
1998 Common Market Council Decision No. 7/98: 
Joint Register Mechanism of Consumers and 
Sellers of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and 
Other Related Materials
1998 Southern Cone Presidential Declaration on 
Combating the Illicit Manufacture and Trafficking 
in Firearms, Ammunition and Related Materials
2004 Common Market Council Decision No. 15/04: 
Memorandum of Understanding for Information 
Exchange on the Manufacture and the Illicit 
Traffic of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and 
Other Related Materials
Africa Regional African Union 
(formerly the 
Organization of 
African Unity)
2000 Bamako Declaration on an African Common 
Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation 
and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Sub-
regional
Eastern Africa Police 
Chiefs Cooperation 
Organisation 
(EAPCCO)
n/a
Economic Community 
of Central African 
States (ECCAS)
2010 Central African Convention for the Control of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their 
Ammunition, Parts and Components that Can Be 
Used for Their Manufacture, Repair or Assembly 
(also known as the Kinshasa Convention) (not yet 
in force)
Economic Community 
of West African States 
(ECOWAS)
1998 Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, 
Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons 
in West Africa (ECOWAS Moratorium) (renewed 
in 2001, 2004)
2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related 
Materials (in force since 2009)
Regional Centre on 
Small Arms in the 
Great Lakes Region, 
the Horn of Africa and 
Bordering States 
(RECSA) (formerly the 
Nairobi Secretariat)
2000 Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Prolife-
ration of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in 
the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa
2004 Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control, and 
Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in 
the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (in 
force since 2006)
Southern African 
Development 
Community (SADC)
2001 Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition 
and Other Related Materials in the SADC Region 
(SADC Protocol) (in force since 2004)
Southern African 
Police Chiefs Coopera-
tion Organisation 
(SARPCCO)
n/a
Region Scope Regional organization Year Instrument85
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Asia Regional Association of 
Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)
1999 ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational 
Crime
2002 ASEAN Work Programme to Implement the 1999 
Plan of Action
Europe Regional European Union (EU) 1991 Council Directive of 18 June 1991 on control of 
the acquisition and possession of weapons 
(91/477/EEC) (updated and amended in 2008 by 
Directive 2008/51/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council)
1998 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports
1998 Joint Action on the EU Contribution to 
Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and 
Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons 
(repealed and replaced in 2002, with 
ammunition included in the scope)
1999 EU Development Council Resolution on  
Small Arms 
2000 EU Plan of Action to Prevent, Combat and 
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects 
2003 EU Common Position 2003/468/CFSP on the 
Control of Arms Brokering (in force since 2003)
2005 EU Strategy to Combat Illicit Accumulation and 
Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons and 
Their Ammunition
2008 EU Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
Defining Common Rules Governing Control of 
Exports of Military Technology and Equipment 
(updated and replaced 1998 Code of Conduct; in 
force since 2008)
2010 EU Council Decision 2010/765/CFSP on EU 
Action to Counter the Illicit Trade of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons by Air
Sub-
regional
Regional Cooperation 
Council
2001 Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan for 
Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in South East Europe (revised  
in 2006)
South Eastern and 
Eastern Europe 
Clearing  house for the 
Control of Small Arms 
and Light Weapons 
(SEESAC)
n/a
Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe
n/a
Euro-
Atlantic
Regional North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)
—Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council 
(EAPC)
—Partnership for 
Peace (PfP)
2009 EAPC Workshop on Combating Illicit Brokering 
in Small Arms and Light Weapons 
Region Scope Regional organization Year InstrumentA
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Euro-
Atlantic
Regional  Organization for 
Security and  
Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE)28
2000 OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons
(continued) 2003 OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional 
Ammunition
2003 OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons
2004 OSCE Principles for Export Controls of MANPADS
2004 OSCE Principles on the Control of Brokering in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons
2004 OSCE Standard Elements of End-user Certificates 
and Verification Procedures for Small Arms and 
Light Weapons Exports
2006 FSC Decision 7/06 Combatting the Illicit Traf  - 
fi  cking of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Air
2008 OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on 
Conventional Ammunition
2010 Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons
Middle East 
and 
Northern 
Africa
Regional League of Arab States 
(LAS)
2002 LAS Arab Model Law on Weapons, Ammunition, 
Explosives and Hazardous Material
2004 LAS Resolution 6447: Arab Coordination for 
Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons
2006 LAS Resolution 6625: Arab Coordination for 
Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons
Pacific Regional Oceania Customs 
Organisation (OCO)
n/a
Pacific Islands Chiefs 
of Police (PICP) 
(formerly the South 
Pacific Chiefs of 
Police Conference 
(SPCPC))
n/a
Pacific Islands Forum 
(PIF)
1992 Declaration by the South Pacific Forum on Law 
Enforcement Cooperation (Honiara Declaration)
2000 Nadi Framework
2003 Weapons Control Bill (updated in 2010)
2009 Cairns Communiqué
Multilateral Wassenaar 
Arrangement on 
Export Control for 
Conventional Arms 
and Dual-Use Goods 
and Technologies29
1996 Initial Elements (amended in 2001)
28   A complete list of relevant documents is available at OSCE (n.d.).
29   A complete list of relevant documents is available at WA (n.d.b). 
Region Scope Regional organization Year Instrument87
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Multilateral 
(continued)
2002 Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small 
Arms and Light Weapons (amended in 2007)
2003 Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS 
(amended in 2007)
2003 Elements for Effective Legislation on Arms 
Brokering 
2007 Best Practices to Prevent Destabilising Transfers 
of Small Arms and Light Weapons through Air 
Transport
2011 Best Practice Guidelines on Subsequent Transfer 
(Re-export) Controls for Conventional Weapons 
Systems contained in Appendix 3 to the 
Wassenaar Arrangement Initial Elements
2011 Elements for Controlling Transportation of 
Conventional Arms between Third Countries
Relationships among organizations
Regional initiatives have generally responded to regional needs while seeking to 
complement established international instruments. Many identify their relation-
ships to the Firearms Protocol, ITI, or PoA through preambular language; others 
continue to declare their support for certain international instruments or pro-
cesses, such as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum. At the same time, the PoA 
and other international processes are responsive to—and, to some extent, seek to 
explore—synergies with regional small arms processes.
Many regional instruments address the same issues, such as the illicit trade, 
transfer, and possession of small arms and light weapons; marking, tracing, and 
record-keeping; harmonizing national legislation; securing stockpiles and des-
troying surplus stockpiles; implementing amnesty and weapon collection pro-
grammes; establishing national points of contact and national coordination 
agencies; and encouraging assistance and cooperation.
Resources
Berman, Eric G. and Kerry Maze. 2012. Regional Organizations and the UN Programme of Action on Small 
Arms (PoA). Handbook. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.
Quick reference
UNODA hosts a website with links to relevant regional organizations as part of its PoA–ISS: 
 <http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/RegionalOrganizations.aspx>
Region Scope Regional organization Year InstrumentA
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Glossary30
assault rifle: a rifle that is usually capable of single-shot, semi-automatic, or fully automatic fire. It is a 
military-style small arm, predominantly used as an infantry weapon, and not generally recog-
nized as suitable for or readily adaptable to sporting or hunting purposes.
automatic firearm: fully automatic weapons continue to fire ammunition for as long as the trigger is 
depressed and ammunition remains in the weapon or feeder. Automatic weapons are sometimes 
referred to as ‘machine guns’ (DeFrancesco et al., 2000, p. 1).
broker: ‘a person or entity acting as an intermediary that brings together relevant parties and arranges 
or facilitates a potential transaction of small arms and light weapons in return for some form of 
benefit, whether financial or otherwise’ (UNGA, 2007a, para. 8). Parties to an arms deal include 
buyers, sellers, transporters, financiers, and insurers. 
While the terms ‘broker’ and ‘dealer’ may not have distinct definitions, they 
are usually differentiated in the small arms field. ‘Dealer’ is used in a domestic context—
and in national law—to refer to a person who trades in or distributes firearms within a 
state or who is a retailer selling weapons on the domestic market. In contrast, a ‘broker’ 
may arrange the sale of weapons, their transport, or financing either domestically or 
internationally, but that broker does not necessarily take physical possession of the arms.
carbine: a short-barrelled variation of the standard rifle. 
cartridge: a single unit or ‘round’ of ammunition consisting of the case, primer, propellant, powder, 
and one or more projectiles (bullets) (King, 2010, p. 25). 
commercial sale (as a form of export): the sale by a company that manufactures small arms in an ex-
porting state to an entity in another country. That entity could be another government or a fire-
arms dealer in the importing state (Parker, 2009, p. 65). See also government-to-government sale.
consignee (or ‘foreign consignee’): the first recipient of exported materiel. The goods may remain 
with the consignee (who would thus be the end user) or they may be forwarded on to the end 
user. Several intermediate consignees may be involved in effecting delivery. The end user is the 
ultimate consignee (Parker, 2009, p. 64). See also end user.
craft production: weapons and ammunition that are fabricated largely by hand in relatively small 
quantities. These include artisanal and home-made weapons.
deactivation: the process of rendering a firearm permanently inoperable so that it can no longer dis-
charge a projectile. 
delivery verification certificate (DVC): a document issued to the exporter by the customs authorities 
of the importing state, confirming that the controlled goods have been delivered or have arrived 
in the importing state; it serves as proof of delivery. A DVC is often requested along with inter-
national import certificates for exports of small arms to a foreign commercial importer (Parker, 
2009, p. 64). See also end-use certificate and international import certificate.
Note
 30  Many of the terms in this glossary are drawn from SAAMI (n.d.).91
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diversion: a shift that causes weapons to enter the illicit sphere or to fall into the hands of an unau-
thorized user, for example by being stolen from state stockpiles, transferred through an illegal 
private sale, or, in the context of international transfers, transferred to unauthorized recipients or 
used in violation of commitments made by the end user prior to export. 
end use: the intended use of the weapons being transferred. Normally the export licence application 
or associated documentation indicates how the end user intends to use the items being exported 
(Parker, 2009, p. 64). 
end user (or ‘ultimate consignee’): the person or entity in the importing state that ultimately receives 
and uses the exported items, such as armed forces or internal security forces (Parker, 2009, p. 64).
end-use(r) certificate (EUC): a document provided by the end user in the importing country. While 
practice varies, an EUC generally contains details of the goods being exported, their value and 
quantity, and names of the parties involved in the transaction, notably the end user. It may also 
specify the end use of the goods and contain an undertaking on the part of the end user not to 
re-export the goods without the approval of or notification to the exporting state. A person who 
applies for a licence to export arms will usually be required to provide an EUC to the national 
export authorities as part of the export licence application process. The certificate may include 
restrictions on the retransfer of the items covered by the EUC; for example, the country importing 
the arms may not be allowed to re-export them without the permission of the state that originally 
manufactured and exported them. EUCs are often required when arms are being exported to a 
foreign state entity, such as the police. See also international import certificate.
export: the physical movement of materiel from the exporting country to the importing country. Ex-
ports may be permanent (such as arms sold to the government of an importing state for use by its 
defence force) or temporary (such as when the army takes small arms on a temporary peacekeeping 
assignment or when individuals take their firearms on a hunting expedition in a foreign country). 
exporting country (or ‘country of origin’): the country from which the arms are exported and that is 
responsible for authorizing the export (granting the export licence) (Parker, 2009, p. 64).
firearm: ‘any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted 
to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive’ (UNGA, 2001c, art. 3(a)). See also 
small arm.
foreign intermediate party: an individual or entity involved in an arms transfer transaction, such as 
a freight forwarder, customs broker, agent or representative, or arms broker (Parker, 2009, p. 64).
government-to-government sale: the sale of small arms by the government of the exporting state to 
the government of the importing state for use by the latter’s defence or police forces. These arms 
may be procured from surplus stockpiles of the exporting government; they may be produced by 
a state-owned company; or the exporting government may procure them on behalf of the import-
ing government from a private arms-manufacturing company operating in the exporting state 
(Parker, 2009, p. 65).
heavy machine gun: a fully automatic light weapon with a calibre of 12.7 mm up to but not including 
20 mm. 
import: the physical movement of goods into the importing country from the exporting country. Im-
ports may be permanent or temporary (see export). 
importing country (or ‘recipient country’ or ‘country of destination’): the country where the end 
user is located (Parker, 2009, p. 64). 
international import certificate (IIC) (or ‘import licence’): a document issued by the government of 
the importing state, confirming that the government is aware of, and does not object to, the   A
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propose  d import of the weapons. IICs are usually required when weapons are being exported to 
a non-state entity, such as a commercial enterprise. Privately issued EUCs (sometimes referred to 
as ‘end-use statements’) are signed and stamped by the commercial entity purchasing the arms, 
and any retransfer restrictions contained in the IIC apply to the commercial importer, not the 
government of the importing state (Parker, 2009, p. 64). See also end-use(r) certificate. 
light weapon: a weapon designed for use by several persons serving as a crew; it may be transported 
by two or more people, a pack animal, or a light vehicle. Weapon types include heavy machine 
guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-air-
craft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems, and 
mortars of less than 100 mm calibre (UNGA, 1997a, paras. 25–27). Note that in contrast to the UN 
definition, the Small Arms Survey includes mortars up to 120 mm in the light weapons category.
long gun: a small arm that is designed to be fired while rested against a shoulder, in contrast to a 
handgun.
man-portable air defence system (MANPADS): a shoulder-launched, surface-to-air missile used to 
fire at low-flying aircraft. 
marking: the act of permanently stamping or imprinting a small arm, light weapon, or their parts and 
components, with at least one unique identifying mark, typically a serial number, although addi-
tional marks may reveal the manufacturer’s name, the model, and date and/or country of manu-
facture. Marking facilitates the tracing of a weapon as it provides information on the weapon’s 
origin and history.
mortar: a muzzle-loaded, smooth-bored, indirect-fire support weapon that enables users to engage 
targets outside their line of sight.
post-delivery controls: checks carried out by the exporting state to verify compliance with end-use 
conditions, such as the condition that no re-export should take place without prior notification to 
the country of origin.
record-keeping: the act of maintaining unique (item-specific) information on the manufacture, sale, 
transfer, possession, and destruction of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition.
re-export: the export of goods that have been imported from another country (the country of origin or 
original exporting state). In some jurisdictions, goods in transit are considered re-exports (or ex-
ports) when they leave the territory of the transit state. In some cases the original exporting state 
may have placed restrictions on the importing state’s ability to re-export the weapons, such as by 
requiring the importing state to notify the original exporting state that it is re-exporting the 
weapons or to obtain permission to re-export. See also retransfer.
registration: the act of recording information about the owner of a weapon in an official database, 
known as a registry.
retransfer: the sale or transfer of weapons that were originally imported from another state to a dif-
ferent end user within or outside the importing state; the latter case is also known as re-export. 
rifle: a long-barrelled firearm that expulses projectiles through a grooved or ‘rifled’ barrel and that is 
designed to be fired from the shoulder. Rifles are a common type of civilian and military small arm.
self-loading or semi-automatic pistol: a handgun that automatically loads a cartridge into its cham-
ber once a round is fired. Unlike with a fully automatic firearm, the trigger must be depressed 
each time a round is fired.
small arm: ‘any man-portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, 
or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an ex-
plosive’ (UNGA, 2005b, para II.4) and that is designed to be carried and used by one person.   93
Example  s of small arms are: revolvers and pistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine guns; assault 
rifles; and light machine guns (UNGA, 1997a, paras. 25–27).
surplus: the quantity of arms that exceeds the requirements of state defence and security forces. It is 
up to national governments to determine how to identify and calculate surplus stockpiles, and 
there is no international definition of surplus. Some states include obsolete weapons (sometimes 
defined as weapons that are unserviceable) in their definition and calculation of ‘surplus’, while 
others treat obsolete weapons as a separate category. 
tracing: the process of using a serial number and other identifying information of an arm to track its 
movement from its source (the manufacturer or importer) through the chain of distribution 
(wholesale, retail, transfer) to the individual or body that procured it (ATF, 1997, p. 25).
transfer: the physical movement of materiel from one state to another or within a country (Parker, 
2009, p. 64).
transhipment: the shipping of materiel to an intermediate destination prior to delivery to the end 
user. It involves a change in the mode of transport (Parker, 2009, p. 64). See also transit. 
transit: the movement of materiel from the exporting state to the importing state through the territory 
of a transit state. In contrast to transhipment, there is no change in the mode of transport. The 
transit state may deem the weapons ‘exports’ or ‘re-exports’ when they leave its territory (Parker, 
2009, p. 64). See also transhipment. 
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